feat: 部署文档与单元文件；P6 渗透自查并修复一处真实缺陷

- docs/deployment.md：中继（反代要点含长轮询超时）、agent（msa-keygen 生成配置）、
  配对窗口、按拒绝原因分流的排障表
- agent/cmd/msa-keygen：生成节点密钥、nodeID、agent token 与配对秘密，打印中继注册条目；
  不生成设备密钥（那是手机的事，能生成就能冒充）
- relay/systemd/simadmin-relay.service：保护指令与 agent 单元的差异逐条写明
  （无 MemoryDenyWriteExecute，因为 V8 JIT 需要 W+X 页）
- test/adversarial.test.js（12 项）：回环硬校验（结构性断言中继无出站路径）、
  重放与新鲜度的责任划分、邮箱深度与 handover、设备注册越权、信封校验边界
- 修 registry.resolve 未校验 nodeID：pending 表只按 reqID 索引，被控节点知道
  另一节点的在途 reqID 即可抢先应答使其变 orphan，合法应答被丢弃
- .gitignore 排除交叉编译产物

cmd/msa-keygen/main.go

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+// Command msa-keygen mints the key material and identifiers a node needs, and prints a config file
+// skeleton to stdout.
+//
+// It exists because the agent's config cannot be written by hand: the two private keys are raw
+// 32-byte values that must be base64, and a node id, an agent token and a device id all have to
+// match patterns the agent and the relay both enforce. An operator generating those with openssl and
+// a text editor will eventually produce a file that fails at startup with a validation error whose
+// cause is a character in the wrong place.
+//
+// It generates the *agent's* keys only. The phone's keys are generated on the phone, at pairing
+// time, and never leave it — a tool that could mint a device key would be a tool that can impersonate
+// a phone.
+package main
+
+import (
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"flag"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+
+	"fun.chick/msa-agent/internal/wire"
+)
+
+func main() {
+	var (
+		nodeID     = flag.String("node", "", "node id (nd_...); generated when empty")
+		relayURL   = flag.String("relay", "https://relay.example", "relay base URL, https")
+		localPort  = flag.Int("port", 3000, "the local SimAdmin port on 127.0.0.1")
+		auditPath  = flag.String("audit", "/var/log/msa-agent/audit.log", "audit log path")
+		agentToken = flag.String("token", "", "relay bearer for this agent; generated when empty")
+		secret     = flag.String("provision-secret", "", "pairing secret for an unprotected node; generated when empty")
+		write      = flag.String("write", "", "write the config here instead of stdout (mode 0600)")
+	)
+	flag.Parse()
+
+	// The signing key is Ed25519 for challenge-response at the relay and for signing responses.
+	_, signingKey, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	check(err)
+	// The key-agreement key is raw X25519: clamping is the curve library's job, and a stored key
+	// that had already been clamped would be a second, non-standard encoding to keep in sync across
+	// three languages.
+	kxKey := make([]byte, wire.KeyBytes)
+	_, err = rand.Read(kxKey)
+	check(err)
+
+	id := *nodeID
+	if id == "" {
+		id = "nd_" + randomHex(5)
+	}
+	token := *agentToken
+	if token == "" {
+		token = randomHex(32)
+	}
+	// The pairing secret is generated even though it is only needed for an unprotected node: a
+	// config without one cannot pair at all, and discovering that at pairing time means another trip
+	// to the node. When the node *is* protected, `nodePassword` takes precedence over this value, so
+	// carrying it is harmless.
+	pairingSecret := *secret
+	if pairingSecret == "" {
+		pairingSecret = randomHex(16)
+	}
+
+	config := map[string]any{
+		"nodeId":     id,
+		"relayUrl":   *relayURL,
+		"agentToken": token,
+		"localPort":  *localPort,
+		"signKey":    base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(signingKey),
+		"kxKey":      base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(kxKey),
+		// The node password is intentionally absent: it is the operator's, and it is the one secret
+		// this tool must not invent. An unprotected node needs no value; a protected one needs the
+		// real password or every command fails with node_auth_failed.
+		"auditPath": *auditPath,
+		// Only used to authorise the pairing window on an unprotected node. Delete it after pairing
+		// if you like; nothing else reads it.
+		"provisionSecret": pairingSecret,
+		// Empty on purpose: devices are added by pairing (`msa-agent --pair`), which is the only
+		// path that should ever be able to introduce a trusted phone.
+		"devices": []any{},
+	}
+
+	encoded, err := json.MarshalIndent(config, "", "  ")
+	check(err)
+	encoded = append(encoded, '\n')
+
+	if *write == "" {
+		// The relay's own registration is printed alongside, because the two files have to agree on
+		// the node id and token and copying them by hand is where that agreement breaks.
+		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "# agent config (paste into %s, then add \"nodePassword\" if the node is protected)\n", "/etc/msa-agent/config.json")
+		os.Stdout.Write(encoded)
+		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "\n# relay registration: add this entry to MSA_AGENTS\n")
+		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "{\"nodeID\":%q,\"token\":%q}\n", id, token)
+		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "\n# pairing secret (unprotected nodes only; protected ones use nodePassword): %s\n", pairingSecret)
+		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "# next: run `msa-agent --pair` on the node once, then pair the phone from the app\n")
+		return
+	}
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(*write), 0o755); err != nil {
+		check(err)
+	}
+	// 0600: this file holds the agent's private keys and the node's password.
+	if err := os.WriteFile(*write, encoded, 0o600); err != nil {
+		check(err)
+	}
+	fmt.Printf("wrote %s (mode 0600)\n", *write)
+	fmt.Printf("relay registration: {\"nodeID\":%q,\"token\":%q}\n", id, token)
+}
+
+func randomHex(bytes int) string {
+	raw := make([]byte, bytes)
+	_, err := rand.Read(raw)
+	check(err)
+	return hex.EncodeToString(raw)
+}
+
+func check(err error) {
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "msa-keygen:", err)
+		os.Exit(1)
+	}
+}