fix(agent): 手机已经放弃的请求不再执行

中继答 504 并说"可能已经执行了，重试前请先确认"——这句话诚实的前提是它保持为真。
批次是串行处理的，所以满邮箱里第八个信封可以在它被签名之后 8 个上游超时才轮到；
那时手机早已被告知失败、用户可能已经重试。再执行它，就把一次诚实的"未知"变成了
一条重复发出的短信。

现在 agent 在动任何东西之前先比对自己的截止时间（策略里的 requestTtlSeconds），
超龄一律以 expired 拒绝并落审计。判定放在新鲜度检查之后、策略判定之前：它比签名
更便宜，而且一个过期请求无论路径是否在白名单里都不该执行。

为了让这条规则**可达**，策略新增一条断言：TTL 不得大于时钟偏移窗口。否则新鲜度
检查会先触发，这条规则永远不会被执行——而"永不触发的规则"是出事时才会被发现坏了
的那种东西。

单个上游调用的超时也移进了策略（agentUpstreamTimeoutSeconds）。"中继期限必须长于
一次上游调用"这个比较，与二进制里的常量是比不了的；现在两侧从同一个文件读，策略
加载时就能拒绝一组自相矛盾的数值。原来那个 20s 常量保留为默认值的来源，不再硬编码。

测试两项：一个请求在期限内被转发、一个超龄请求被拒且**没有被转发**（计数按路径，
否则首次转发前的 /api/auth/status 探测会让断言以错误的理由通过）；另一项断言策略
本身满足上述两个关系。变异验证：关掉判定，第一项失败。

Go 全包、Node 119 项、Swift 101 项通过。

internal/policy/agent-policy.json

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
   "dangerous": ["/api/sms/send", "/api/sms/batch-delete"],
   "limits": {
     "dangerousWritesPerMinute": 6,
+    "agentUpstreamTimeoutSeconds": 20,
     "maxRequestBytes": 262144,
     "maxResponseBytes": 262144,
     "requestTtlSeconds": 30,

internal/policy/policy.go

@@ -39,12 +39,17 @@ type AuthPaths struct {
 
 type Limits struct {
 	DangerousWritesPerMinute int `json:"dangerousWritesPerMinute"`
-	MaxRequestBytes          int `json:"maxRequestBytes"`
-	MaxResponseBytes         int `json:"maxResponseBytes"`
-	RequestTTLSeconds        int `json:"requestTtlSeconds"`
-	ClockSkewSeconds         int `json:"clockSkewSeconds"`
-	ReplayCacheSize          int `json:"replayCacheSize"`
-	MailboxDepth             int `json:"mailboxDepth"`
+	// AgentUpstreamTimeoutSeconds is how long one loopback call to SimAdmin may take. It lives in the
+	// policy rather than only in the agent's code because the relay's deadline has to be compared
+	// against it, and a comparison between a policy file and a constant in a binary is not one
+	// anything can check.
+	AgentUpstreamTimeoutSeconds int `json:"agentUpstreamTimeoutSeconds"`
+	MaxRequestBytes             int `json:"maxRequestBytes"`
+	MaxResponseBytes            int `json:"maxResponseBytes"`
+	RequestTTLSeconds           int `json:"requestTtlSeconds"`
+	ClockSkewSeconds            int `json:"clockSkewSeconds"`
+	ReplayCacheSize             int `json:"replayCacheSize"`
+	MailboxDepth                int `json:"mailboxDepth"`
 }
 
 type Policy struct {
@@ -148,13 +153,14 @@ func Parse(raw []byte) (*Policy, error) {
 	}
 
 	for name, value := range map[string]int{
-		"dangerousWritesPerMinute": p.Limits.DangerousWritesPerMinute,
-		"maxRequestBytes":          p.Limits.MaxRequestBytes,
-		"maxResponseBytes":         p.Limits.MaxResponseBytes,
-		"requestTtlSeconds":        p.Limits.RequestTTLSeconds,
-		"clockSkewSeconds":         p.Limits.ClockSkewSeconds,
-		"replayCacheSize":          p.Limits.ReplayCacheSize,
-		"mailboxDepth":             p.Limits.MailboxDepth,
+		"dangerousWritesPerMinute":    p.Limits.DangerousWritesPerMinute,
+		"maxRequestBytes":             p.Limits.MaxRequestBytes,
+		"maxResponseBytes":            p.Limits.MaxResponseBytes,
+		"requestTtlSeconds":           p.Limits.RequestTTLSeconds,
+		"agentUpstreamTimeoutSeconds": p.Limits.AgentUpstreamTimeoutSeconds,
+		"clockSkewSeconds":            p.Limits.ClockSkewSeconds,
+		"replayCacheSize":             p.Limits.ReplayCacheSize,
+		"mailboxDepth":                p.Limits.MailboxDepth,
 	} {
 		if value <= 0 {
 			return nil, fmt.Errorf("policy: limits.%s must be positive, got %d", name, value)
@@ -163,8 +169,20 @@ func Parse(raw []byte) (*Policy, error) {
 	if p.Limits.ClockSkewSeconds > 300 {
 		return nil, errors.New("policy: clockSkewSeconds is too wide to bound replay")
 	}
+	// The relay's deadline has to sit inside the clock-skew window, and the reason is not tidiness.
+	//
+	// The freshness check above rejects an envelope whose timestamp is further from now than
+	// clockSkewSeconds. The agent's own deadline check rejects one older than requestTtlSeconds. If the
+	// TTL were the larger of the two, the freshness check would fire first and the deadline check would
+	// be unreachable — a rule that can never fire, which is the kind of thing that gets discovered
+	// during an incident by someone who assumed it was working.
 	if p.Limits.RequestTTLSeconds > p.Limits.ClockSkewSeconds {
-		return nil, errors.New("policy: requestTtlSeconds exceeds clockSkewSeconds and would never be enforced")
+		return nil, errors.New("policy: requestTtlSeconds exceeds clockSkewSeconds, so the agent's deadline check would never be reached")
+	}
+	// And the node must not be told to wait longer than the phone is willing to. The two are one
+	// decision — how long a request may take end to end — stated in the file that both sides read.
+	if p.Limits.RequestTTLSeconds*1000 <= p.Limits.AgentUpstreamTimeoutSeconds*1000 {
+		return nil, errors.New("policy: requestTtlSeconds must exceed the per-request upstream timeout, or the relay deadline is not the longer bound")
 	}
 	if p.Limits.ReplayCacheSize < p.Limits.MailboxDepth {
 		return nil, errors.New("policy: replayCacheSize is smaller than mailboxDepth, so entries can be evicted while still queued")