baseline: P1 契约、agent 核心与中继投递（既有工作首次入库）

2026-09-16 08:41:13 +08:00
commit 54d9696a4d
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+[Unit]
+Description=MultiSimAdmin relay agent
+Documentation=https://gitea.chickliu.fun/Hermes/simadmin-relay
+After=network-online.target
+Wants=network-online.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+ExecStart=/opt/msa-agent/msa-agent --config /etc/msa-agent/config.json
+Restart=always
+# Backing off on our own is not enough: a relay that is down for an hour should not be hammered by
+# every node in the fleet the moment it comes back.
+RestartSec=5
+TimeoutStopSec=20
+KillSignal=SIGTERM
+
+User=msa-agent
+Group=msa-agent
+
+# The agent needs almost nothing from the host. Everything below is a capability the process never
+# uses, removed so that a compromise of the agent is not automatically a compromise of the box.
+NoNewPrivileges=yes
+PrivateDevices=yes
+PrivateTmp=yes
+PrivateUsers=yes
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=yes
+ProtectKernelTunables=yes
+ProtectKernelModules=yes
+ProtectClock=yes
+ProtectControlGroups=yes
+ProtectHostname=yes
+ProtectKernelLogs=yes
+RestrictNamespaces=yes
+RestrictRealtime=yes
+RestrictSUIDSGID=yes
+LockPersonality=yes
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes
+RemoveIPC=yes
+UMask=0077
+
+# Configuration and the audit log are the only writable paths. ReadWritePaths is what keeps
+# ProtectSystem=strict from making the audit log unwritable.
+ReadWritePaths=/var/log/msa-agent
+ConfigurationDirectory=msa-agent
+LogsDirectory=msa-agent
+
+# AF_INET and AF_INET6 only: the agent dials out to the relay and to 127.0.0.1, so it has no reason
+# to reach a Unix socket, a netlink family or a packet socket.
+#
+# No IPAddressDeny / IPAddressAllow pair here, deliberately. It reads like the obvious way to pin the
+# agent to loopback, and it is wrong: those directives filter both directions, so IPAddressDeny=any
+# would also cut the outbound connection to the relay the agent exists to maintain. The loopback
+# invariant is enforced in code by internal/egress, which is testable, rather than by a directive
+# that silently breaks the only path out.
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_INET AF_INET6
+# No capability at all, so the process cannot even ask to bind a privileged port.
+CapabilityBoundingSet=
+AmbientCapabilities=
+SystemCallFilter=@system-service
+SystemCallErrorNumber=EPERM
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target