// Package pair implements the agent's temporary management surface from design §7.
//
// It is the only place the agent binds a listening socket, and it exists only while the operator
// runs `msa-agent --pair`. That is the whole reason the design requires the window to be temporary:
// an admin port that can inject trusted devices and stays open indefinitely is a second hole beside
// the relay, reachable by anyone on the LAN without ever touching a phone. So the window is closed
// three ways: the first successful pairing shuts it, a failed-attempt ceiling shuts it, and a
// deadline shuts it even if nothing happens at all.
//
// Authentication is the node password, presented by the phone over the LAN. This works because of
// the one fact the pairing flow leans on: at pairing time the phone is necessarily already on the
// internal network, so the shared secret never has to traverse the relay.
package pair

import (
	"crypto/ed25519"
	"crypto/subtle"
	"encoding/base64"
	"encoding/json"
	"errors"
	"fmt"
	"net"
	"net/http"
	"sync"
	"time"

	"fun.chick/msa-agent/internal/config"
	"fun.chick/msa-agent/internal/wire"
)

// Limits. The attempt ceiling is small on purpose: the pairing secret is a human password, and a
// window where anyone on the LAN can try it a thousand times is a window that leaks the node.
const (
	MaxAttempts     = 10
	DefaultWindow   = 10 * time.Minute
	MaxRequestBytes = 8 << 10
	// DefaultAdminHost is a literal, not a name and not empty.
	//
	// The window grants device trust: whoever reaches /provision with the node password gets a key the
	// agent will obey. So the bind address decides who can even attempt that, and the default has to be
	// the narrowest thing that still lets the documented flow work.
	//
	// It cannot be 127.0.0.1. Pairing happens over the LAN by design — the phone dials the node's LAN
	// address, which is what makes a QR code unnecessary — and a listener on loopback is not reachable
	// from another host. A loopback default would not be a hardening measure; it would be a flow that
	// never works, and the operator's first experience of this feature would be a refused connection
	// with no explanation.
	//
	// It is a literal rather than a name for a different reason: a name is resolved at bind time, so the
	// listening address would depend on what DNS said at that moment. That is not a decision the
	// operator made, and on a node whose resolver is compromised it is a decision someone else made.
	// Operators who want a narrower or wider bind pass --pair-bind.
	DefaultAdminHost = "0.0.0.0"
	DefaultAdminPort = 3001
)

var (
	ErrNoSecret = errors.New("pair: the node is unprotected and no provisionSecret is configured, so pairing cannot be authorised")
	ErrClosed   = errors.New("pair: the pairing window is closed")
	ErrRefused  = errors.New("pair: too many failed pairing attempts")
)

// Handler serves /provision and /destroy and nothing else.
type Handler struct {
	mu        sync.Mutex
	cfg       config.File
	cfgPath   string
	nodeID    string
	agentSign ed25519.PublicKey
	agentKx   []byte
	secret    string
	attempts  int
	closed    bool
	// Done is closed once the window should end: a completed pairing, the attempt ceiling, or an
	// explicit destroy. main.go selects on it to shut the listener and exit.
	Done chan struct{}

	log func(event string, fields map[string]any)
}

// New builds the handler from the loaded config. SignKey/KxKey are the agent's private keys; the
// public halves are derived here so a phone can never be handed a key that disagrees with the
// private one the agent commands with.
func New(cfgPath string, cfg config.File, log func(string, map[string]any)) (*Handler, error) {
	if len(cfg.SignKey) == 0 || len(cfg.KxKey) == 0 {
		return nil, errors.New("pair: agent keys are missing from the config")
	}
	signRaw, err := base64.StdEncoding.Strict().DecodeString(cfg.SignKey)
	if err != nil || len(signRaw) != ed25519.PrivateKeySize {
		return nil, errors.New("pair: signKey must be a base64 ed25519 private key")
	}
	kxRaw, err := base64.StdEncoding.Strict().DecodeString(cfg.KxKey)
	if err != nil || len(kxRaw) != 32 {
		return nil, errors.New("pair: kxKey must be a base64 32-byte x25519 private key")
	}
	secret := cfg.NodePassword
	if secret == "" {
		secret = cfg.ProvisionSecret
	}
	if secret == "" {
		return nil, ErrNoSecret
	}
	h := &Handler{
		cfg:       cfg,
		cfgPath:   cfgPath,
		nodeID:    cfg.NodeID,
		agentSign: ed25519.PrivateKey(signRaw).Public().(ed25519.PublicKey),
		agentKx:   kxRaw,
		secret:    secret,
		Done:      make(chan struct{}),
		log:       log,
	}
	if h.log == nil {
		h.log = func(string, map[string]any) {}
	}
	return h, nil
}

// Routes is the complete surface. Anything else is 404, and 404 carries no body that could hint at
// what does exist here.
func (h *Handler) Routes() http.Handler {
	mux := http.NewServeMux()
	mux.HandleFunc("POST /provision", h.provision)
	mux.HandleFunc("POST /destroy", h.destroy)
	mux.HandleFunc("/", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound) })
	return mux
}

type provisionRequest struct {
	Password   string `json:"password"`
	AppSignPub string `json:"appSignPub"`
	AppKxPub   string `json:"appKxPub"`
	DeviceName string `json:"deviceName,omitempty"`
}

type provisionResponse struct {
	NodeID       string `json:"nodeID"`
	AppID        string `json:"appID"`
	AgentSignPub string `json:"agentSignPub"`
	AgentKxPub   string `json:"agentKxPub"`
	RelayURL     string `json:"relayURL"`
	DeviceToken  string `json:"deviceToken"`
}

// Close ends the window: after a completed pairing or an explicit destroy, no further request is
// answered even one that races in before the listener stops.
func (h *Handler) Close() {
	h.mu.Lock()
	defer h.mu.Unlock()
	h.closeLocked()
}

func (h *Handler) closeLocked() {
	if !h.closed {
		h.closed = true
		close(h.Done)
	}
}

func (h *Handler) provision(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	var body provisionRequest
	limited := http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, MaxRequestBytes)
	if err := json.NewDecoder(limited).Decode(&body); err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "the pairing request is not valid JSON")
		return
	}
	if _, err := decodeKey(body.AppSignPub, ed25519.PublicKeySize, "appSignPub"); err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
		return
	}
	if _, err := decodeKey(body.AppKxPub, 32, "appKxPub"); err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
		return
	}

	h.mu.Lock()
	defer h.mu.Unlock()
	if h.closed {
		writeError(w, http.StatusGone, "the pairing window is closed")
		return
	}
	if !h.authorize(body.Password) {
		h.log("pair_attempt", map[string]any{"outcome": "bad_secret", "peer": peerOf(r)})
		writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "the shared secret did not match")
		return
	}

	deviceID := config.NewDeviceID()
	relayToken := config.NewRelayToken()
	h.cfg.Devices = append(h.cfg.Devices, config.Device{
		ID:         deviceID,
		SignKey:    body.AppSignPub,
		Name:       body.DeviceName,
		RelayToken: relayToken,
	})
	if err := config.Save(h.cfgPath, h.cfg); err != nil {
		// The device was not added if the save failed, so a retry is safe and the phone must not
		// be handed a keypair the agent will not honour.
		h.log("pair_attempt", map[string]any{"outcome": "save_failed", "error": err.Error(), "peer": peerOf(r)})
		writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "the agent could not persist the pairing")
		return
	}
	// One pairing closes the window (design §7 step 4: 配对成功后 agent 关闭管理监听). Adding a
	// second phone means re-running --pair, which is the right amount of friction for a socket
	// that grants device trust.
	h.closeLocked()
	h.log("pair_provision", map[string]any{"outcome": "ok", "app": deviceID, "peer": peerOf(r)})
	writeJSON(w, provisionResponse{
		NodeID:       h.nodeID,
		AppID:        deviceID,
		AgentSignPub: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(h.agentSign),
		AgentKxPub:   base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(mustPublic(h.agentKx)),
		RelayURL:     h.cfg.RelayURL,
		DeviceToken:  relayToken,
	})
}

func (h *Handler) destroy(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	var body struct {
		Password string `json:"password"`
	}
	limited := http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, MaxRequestBytes)
	if err := json.NewDecoder(limited).Decode(&body); err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "the destroy request is not valid JSON")
		return
	}
	h.mu.Lock()
	defer h.mu.Unlock()
	if h.closed {
		writeError(w, http.StatusGone, "the pairing window is closed")
		return
	}
	if !h.authorize(body.Password) {
		h.log("pair_attempt", map[string]any{"outcome": "bad_secret_destroy", "peer": peerOf(r)})
		writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "the shared secret did not match")
		return
	}
	h.cfg.Devices = nil
	if err := config.Save(h.cfgPath, h.cfg); err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "the agent could not persist the destroy")
		return
	}
	h.closeLocked()
	h.log("pair_destroy", map[string]any{"outcome": "ok", "peer": peerOf(r)})
	writeJSON(w, map[string]any{"destroyed": true})
}

// authorize burns an attempt slot on every failure and closes the window at the ceiling. The
// compare is constant time; the counter is what stops the window from being a password oracle.
func (h *Handler) authorize(presented string) bool {
	match := subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(presented), []byte(h.secret)) == 1
	if !match {
		h.attempts++
		if h.attempts >= MaxAttempts {
			h.log("pair_attempt", map[string]any{"outcome": "too_many"})
			h.closeLocked()
		}
	}
	return match
}

func decodeKey(value string, size int, field string) ([]byte, error) {
	raw, err := base64.StdEncoding.Strict().DecodeString(value)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s is not valid base64", field)
	}
	if len(raw) != size {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s must be %d bytes", field, size)
	}
	return raw, nil
}

func mustPublic(private []byte) []byte {
	// Derive, never store: a published kx key that disagreed with the agent's private key would
	// fail as an unreadable request with no useful cause.
	key, err := wire.PublicFrom(private)
	if err != nil {
		panic(fmt.Sprintf("pair: agent kx key is unusable: %v", err))
	}
	return key
}

// peerOf reports the caller's address, for the log only.
//
// It is the one piece of context the attempt ceiling cannot supply: "ten failed pairings" says the
// window closed, and "ten failed pairings from 10.0.0.7" says someone is trying. Only the IP is kept,
// never the port, because the port is a fresh ephemeral number on every attempt and would make two
// attempts from one host look like two hosts.
func peerOf(r *http.Request) string {
	host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
	if err != nil {
		return r.RemoteAddr
	}
	return host
}

func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, body any) {
	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
	json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(body)
}

func writeError(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, detail string) {
	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
	w.WriteHeader(status)
	json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{"error": detail})
}