节点侧现在有两条命令覆盖整个生命周期,中继侧有了一条让节点不必被人工登记就能加入 的通道。 agent 新增两个子命令: - `msa-agent enroll --relay <url> [--code <code>]` 铸造密钥与标识并写配置。它和 `msa-keygen` 共用 internal/enroll,所以两者不会对"配置长什么样"产生分歧——区别只在 运行位置:keygen 需要 Go 工具链,而节点上只有交叉编译好的二进制。带 --code 时它自己 向中继登记,顺序是先登记再落盘:为"中继还不认识的节点"写下的配置会永远重试 401,而 运维无法把这种情况和网络故障区分开。 - `msa-agent uninstall [--dry-run] [--keep-logs]` 按唯一一个不会留下悬挂状态的顺序拆除: 先清设备并告诉中继,再停服务、删单元、删配置目录、删日志、删用户。顺序是重点——先删 节点会让中继继续向一台已经不存在的节点投递,而"一键卸载"此前根本不存在,尽管安装会 往宿主机放六样东西,其中配置里还有节点密码。 写这个时踩到一个值得记的坑:第一版把每个动作都写成"先 log 再执行",于是 --dry-run 会真的停掉服务——一个不是 dry run 的 dry run。现在每个副作用都 gate 在 step() 的 返回值上,并有测试断言 dry run 一条命令都不跑。 中继新增自注册,默认关闭: - `POST /v1/enroll/code`(运维令牌)铸造一次性码,15 分钟、最多 10 个未使用。 - `POST /v1/enroll` 节点用码登记自己。码先兑换再校验登记体,所以用垃圾请求探测码是否 有效的尝试会烧掉它。 - 登记只授权"加入"这一件事。中继仍然读不到内容、伪造不了应答、下发不了命令——最坏情况 是让一个不该出现的节点出现,也就是拒绝服务,正是设计已经接受的边界。 - agents.json 的条目优先于自注册状态,所以运维永远能用一个 diff 覆盖或吊销自注册的节点; 反过来,节点不能覆盖运维条目(被拒绝,400)。 - 自注册状态要落盘,这是中继第一次有它必须记住的东西。中继此前无状态是它的一条性质, 这里明确让掉了:忘记已登记的节点会让它们全部 401,而症状看起来像 token 坏了。状态文件 原子写、损坏时拒绝启动(而不是静默变成空机群),systemd 单元用 StateDirectory 给它一块 可写目录,其余文件系统仍是只读。 测试:internal/enroll 五项(两份产物必须描述同一个节点、密码只在给出时写入、给定标识 不被重新生成、两次铸造不同、缺输入被拒),internal/install 七项(删干净、顺序、中继不可 达仍完成、dry run 不动任何东西、保留日志、缺件不中止、计划列出每条路径), test/enrollment.test.js 十四项(流程、码单次、垃圾请求烧码、默认关闭、只有运维能铸造、 不能覆盖运维条目、可重复登记、重启后仍在、运维优先、损坏状态拒绝启动、码过期与清扫、 铸造循环不涨内存、登记体校验、状态文件不含私钥)。变异验证:去掉码的单次性、去掉运维条目 保护、让 dry run 执行命令、先删配置再通知中继——四处都让对应测试失败。 Go 全包、Node 134 项、Swift 107 项通过。
72 lines
2.9 KiB
Go
72 lines
2.9 KiB
Go
// Command msa-keygen prints the key material, identifiers and secrets a node needs, as a config file
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// and a relay registration entry.
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//
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// It is a thin wrapper over internal/enroll, which is also what `msa-agent enroll` calls. The two must
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// not drift: one writes the config an operator places, the other writes it on the node, and a
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// disagreement between them would show up as a node that pairs and then cannot authenticate.
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//
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// It generates the *agent's* keys only. The phone's keys are generated on the phone, at pairing time,
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// and never leave it — a tool that could mint a device key would be a tool that can impersonate a
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// phone.
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package main
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import (
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"flag"
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"fmt"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"fun.chick/msa-agent/internal/enroll"
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)
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func main() {
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var (
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nodeID = flag.String("node", "", "node id (nd_...); generated when empty")
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relayURL = flag.String("relay", "https://relay.example", "relay base URL, https")
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localPort = flag.Int("port", 3000, "the local SimAdmin port on 127.0.0.1")
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auditPath = flag.String("audit", "/var/log/msa-agent/audit.log", "audit log path")
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agentToken = flag.String("token", "", "relay bearer for this agent; generated when empty")
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secret = flag.String("provision-secret", "", "pairing secret for an unprotected node; generated when empty")
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write = flag.String("write", "", "write the config here instead of stdout (mode 0600)")
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)
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flag.Parse()
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result, err := enroll.Generate(enroll.Options{
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RelayURL: *relayURL,
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LocalPort: *localPort,
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AuditPath: *auditPath,
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NodeID: *nodeID,
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AgentToken: *agentToken,
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ProvisionSecret: *secret,
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})
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check(err)
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if *write == "" {
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// The relay's own registration is printed alongside, because the two files have to agree on the
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// node id, the token and the signing key, and copying them by hand is where that agreement breaks.
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fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "# agent config (paste into %s, then add \"nodePassword\" if the node is protected)\n", "/etc/msa-agent/config.json")
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os.Stdout.Write(result.Config)
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fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "\n# relay registration: add this entry to MSA_AGENTS\n")
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fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "%s\n", result.Registration)
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fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "\n# pairing secret (unprotected nodes only; protected ones use nodePassword): %s\n", result.ProvisionSecret)
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fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "# next: run `msa-agent --pair` on the node once, then pair the phone from the app\n")
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return
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}
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if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(*write), 0o755); err != nil {
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check(err)
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}
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// 0600: this file holds the agent's private keys and, on a protected node, the node password.
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if err := os.WriteFile(*write, result.Config, 0o600); err != nil {
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check(err)
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}
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fmt.Printf("wrote %s (mode 0600)\n", *write)
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fmt.Printf("relay registration: %s\n", result.Registration)
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}
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func check(err error) {
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if err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "msa-keygen:", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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}
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