msa-agent/internal/enroll/register.go

package enroll

import (
	"bytes"
	"context"
	"crypto/tls"
	"crypto/x509"
	"encoding/json"
	"fmt"
	"io"
	"net/http"
	"os"
	"strings"
	"time"

	"fun.chick/msa-agent/internal/relayurl"
)

// Register announces this node to the relay, using a one-time code an operator generated in the app.
//
// This is the step that lets a node join without anyone editing the relay's agents.json, and it is the
// only place in this system where the relay learns about a node it did not already know. What the code
// buys is bounded and worth stating: it authorises *registration*, nothing else. The relay still cannot
// read a request, cannot forge an answer, and cannot command anything — the phone's signature and the
// agent's pinned keys are unchanged. The worst a stolen code can do is make a node appear, which is a
// denial of service, the outcome the design already accepts for a compromised relay.
type RegisterOptions struct {
	// RelayURL is the relay's base URL, https.
	RelayURL string
	// Code is the one-time enrollment code.
	Code string
	// Registration is the entry to install: node id, bearer token, signing public key.
	Registration Registration
	// RelayCAFile pins a CA instead of the system trust store. Same meaning as the agent's own
	// relayCAFile: it replaces the trust root rather than disabling verification.
	RelayCAFile string
	// Timeout bounds the whole exchange. A node with no route to the relay should fail in seconds, not
	// hang the install.
	Timeout time.Duration
}

// Register posts the registration and returns nil when the relay accepted it.
//
// The failure vocabulary is deliberately small and each case names the next action, because this runs
// during an install and the operator is looking at one line of output.
func Register(ctx context.Context, opts RegisterOptions) error {
	// The same rule the daemon applies, from the same package. This check is not redundant with the
	// config validation in Generate: registration happens *before* the config is written, so a URL this
	// rejected late would already have been sent to a host the operator did not mean to reach.
	if err := relayurl.Validate(opts.RelayURL); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("enroll: %w", err)
	}
	if strings.TrimSpace(opts.Code) == "" {
		return fmt.Errorf("enroll: the enrollment code is empty")
	}

	body, err := json.Marshal(struct {
		Code string `json:"code"`
		Registration
	}{Code: opts.Code, Registration: opts.Registration})
	if err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("enroll: encoding the registration: %w", err)
	}

	timeout := opts.Timeout
	if timeout <= 0 {
		timeout = 20 * time.Second
	}
	client := &http.Client{Timeout: timeout}
	if opts.RelayCAFile != "" {
		pem, err := os.ReadFile(opts.RelayCAFile)
		if err != nil {
			return fmt.Errorf("enroll: relayCAFile: %w", err)
		}
		pool := x509.NewCertPool()
		if !pool.AppendCertsFromPEM(pem) {
			return fmt.Errorf("enroll: relayCAFile %s contains no PEM certificates", opts.RelayCAFile)
		}
		// A fresh transport rather than a mutated DefaultTransport, so this does not change trust for
		// anything else in the process.
		client.Transport = &http.Transport{
			TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{RootCAs: pool, MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12},
		}
	}

	endpoint := strings.TrimRight(opts.RelayURL, "/") + "/v1/enroll"
	request, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, endpoint, bytes.NewReader(body))
	if err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("enroll: request: %w", err)
	}
	request.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
	response, err := client.Do(request)
	if err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("enroll: cannot reach the relay at %s: %w", endpoint, err)
	}
	defer func() {
		io.Copy(io.Discard, response.Body)
		response.Body.Close()
	}()

	if response.StatusCode == http.StatusOK {
		return nil
	}
	// The relay's refusals are the ones an operator has to act on, so the detail is passed through
	// rather than replaced with a status code.
	detail := readDetail(response.Body)
	switch response.StatusCode {
	case http.StatusUnauthorized, http.StatusForbidden:
		return fmt.Errorf("enroll: the relay refused the code (%s). Codes are single-use and short-lived; "+
			"generate a new install command in the app", detail)
	case http.StatusConflict:
		return fmt.Errorf("enroll: the relay already knows this node (%s)", detail)
	case http.StatusNotFound:
		return fmt.Errorf("enroll: this relay does not accept self-enrollment (%s). Add this node to its "+
			"agents.json by hand, or enable enrollment on the relay", detail)
	default:
		return fmt.Errorf("enroll: the relay refused the registration: %d %s", response.StatusCode, detail)
	}
}

// readDetail pulls the RFC 9457 `detail` field out of a refusal, falling back to the raw body.
func readDetail(body io.Reader) string {
	raw, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(body, 4<<10))
	if err != nil || len(raw) == 0 {
		return "no detail"
	}
	var problem struct {
		Detail string `json:"detail"`
		Code   string `json:"code"`
	}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &problem); err == nil && problem.Detail != "" {
		if problem.Code != "" {
			return problem.Code + ": " + problem.Detail
		}
		return problem.Detail
	}
	return strings.TrimSpace(string(raw))
}