Files
msa-agent/internal/pair/pair_test.go
T
chick b5f548f1ad feat(agent): 配对窗口可显式绑定地址,默认仍是内网可达
配对窗口是 agent 唯一持有的监听端口,而它授予的是设备信任:谁能带节点密码打到
/provision,谁就拿到一把 agent 会听命的密钥。此前它固定绑所有接口,且没有任何办法
收窄——一台本身能从公网路由到的节点(公网 VPS 上的 SimAdmin、放在非可信网络里的
设备)在窗口开启期间就把这个面暴露给了整个互联网。

现在加 --pair-bind,只接受 IP 字面量。不接受主机名是刻意的:绑定时解析名字意味着
监听地址取决于 DNS 当时说什么,那不是运维做过的决定。

默认值仍是绑所有接口,这个我改过一次又改回来了,原因值得记下来:我先把默认设成
127.0.0.1 并写了理由,然后发现配对按设计走内网、手机要直接打到节点,回环监听从
另一台机器根本连不上——那不是一个加固措施,而是一个永远不工作的流程,用户对这个
功能的第一次体验会是"连接被拒"且没有解释。所以默认保持内网可达,把"节点能从公网
路由到时请收窄"写进部署文档,并在 --pair-bind 上给出显式入口。

测试断言默认值同时满足两件事:是 IP 字面量(不是名字),且不是回环(手机要能连)。

Go 全包、Node 120 项、Swift 107 项通过。
2026-09-17 07:47:25 +08:00

306 lines
10 KiB
Go

package pair
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/ed25519"
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"fun.chick/msa-agent/internal/config"
)
func agentConfig(t *testing.T) (string, config.File, ed25519.PrivateKey) {
t.Helper()
_, sign, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
kx := make([]byte, 32)
rand.Read(kx)
cfg := config.File{
NodeID: "nd_7f3a9c2e",
RelayURL: "https://relay.example",
AgentToken: "agent-token",
LocalPort: 8788,
SignKey: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(sign),
KxKey: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(kx),
AuditPath: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "audit.log"),
NodePassword: "hunter2",
}
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
if err := config.Save(path, cfg); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return path, cfg, sign
}
func phoneKeys(t *testing.T) (string, string) {
t.Helper()
pub, _, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
kx := make([]byte, 32)
rand.Read(kx)
return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(pub), base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(kx)
}
func provisionBody(t *testing.T, password, signPub, kxPub string) *bytes.Buffer {
t.Helper()
body, err := json.Marshal(map[string]string{
"password": password, "appSignPub": signPub, "appKxPub": kxPub, "deviceName": "chick",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return bytes.NewBuffer(body)
}
func openHandler(t *testing.T, path string, cfg config.File) *Handler {
t.Helper()
h, err := New(path, cfg, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("New: %v", err)
}
return h
}
func TestProvisionPairsThePhoneAndClosesTheWindow(t *testing.T) {
path, cfg, sign := agentConfig(t)
h := openHandler(t, path, cfg)
signPub, kxPub := phoneKeys(t)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.Routes().ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/provision",
provisionBody(t, "hunter2", signPub, kxPub)))
if rec.Code != 200 {
t.Fatalf("provision status %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body)
}
var out provisionResponse
if err := json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &out); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if out.NodeID != "nd_7f3a9c2e" || !strings.HasPrefix(out.AppID, "ap_") || out.DeviceToken == "" {
t.Fatalf("response: %+v", out)
}
if len(out.AgentSignPub) != base64.StdEncoding.EncodedLen(ed25519.PublicKeySize) {
t.Fatalf("agent signing key not published: %q", out.AgentSignPub)
}
// The published key must verify what the agent's private key signs: the pairing response is
// the phone's only source for the trust anchor.
proof := ed25519.Sign(sign, []byte("x"))
gotPub, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(out.AgentSignPub)
if err != nil || !ed25519.Verify(gotPub, []byte("x"), proof) {
t.Fatal("published signing key does not match the private key")
}
// The config on disk carries the device, with a relay token generated by the agent.
reloaded, err := config.Load(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("config after pairing must be loadable: %v", err)
}
if len(reloaded.Devices) != 1 || reloaded.Devices[0].ID != out.AppID ||
reloaded.Devices[0].SignKey != signPub || reloaded.Devices[0].RelayToken != out.DeviceToken {
t.Fatalf("persisted devices: %+v", reloaded.Devices)
}
// The window closed with the pairing: a second phone is refused.
rec = httptest.NewRecorder()
h.Routes().ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/provision",
provisionBody(t, "hunter2", signPub, kxPub)))
if rec.Code != http.StatusGone {
t.Fatalf("second pairing got %d, want 410", rec.Code)
}
select {
case <-h.Done:
default:
t.Fatal("Done was not closed after a completed pairing")
}
}
func TestAWrongSecretIsRefusedAndNothingIsPersisted(t *testing.T) {
path, cfg, _ := agentConfig(t)
h := openHandler(t, path, cfg)
signPub, kxPub := phoneKeys(t)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.Routes().ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/provision",
provisionBody(t, "wrong", signPub, kxPub)))
if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("status %d", rec.Code)
}
// LoadForPairing, not Load: this config legitimately has no devices yet, which is exactly the
// state that must survive a refused attempt.
reloaded, err := config.LoadForPairing(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(reloaded.Devices) != 0 {
t.Fatal("a refused pairing was still persisted")
}
}
// The pairing secret is a human password and the window is LAN-reachable, so the attempt ceiling is
// the difference between a management port and a password oracle.
func TestTheAttemptCeilingShutsTheWindow(t *testing.T) {
path, cfg, _ := agentConfig(t)
h := openHandler(t, path, cfg)
signPub, kxPub := phoneKeys(t)
for i := 0; i < MaxAttempts; i++ {
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.Routes().ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/provision",
provisionBody(t, "guess", signPub, kxPub)))
if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("attempt %d: status %d", i, rec.Code)
}
}
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.Routes().ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/provision",
provisionBody(t, "hunter2", signPub, kxPub)))
if rec.Code != http.StatusGone {
t.Fatalf("after the ceiling, a correct password got %d, want 410", rec.Code)
}
}
func TestBadKeyMaterialIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
path, cfg, _ := agentConfig(t)
h := openHandler(t, path, cfg)
_, kxPub := phoneKeys(t)
for _, body := range []string{
`{"password":"hunter2","appSignPub":"not base64!!","appKxPub":"` + kxPub + `"}`,
// 31 bytes decodes fine but is the wrong size; the strict length check is the point.
`{"password":"hunter2","appSignPub":"` + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(make([]byte, 31)) + `","appKxPub":"` + kxPub + `"}`,
`{"password":"hunter2","appSignPub":"` + strings.Repeat("A", 44) + `","appKxPub":"` + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(make([]byte, 1)) + `"}`,
} {
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.Routes().ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/provision", strings.NewReader(body)))
if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("accepted key material %q with %d", body, rec.Code)
}
}
}
func TestDestroyClearsDevicesAndCloses(t *testing.T) {
path, cfg, _ := agentConfig(t)
h := openHandler(t, path, cfg)
signPub, kxPub := phoneKeys(t)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.Routes().ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/provision",
provisionBody(t, "hunter2", signPub, kxPub)))
if rec.Code != 200 {
t.Fatal(rec.Body.String())
}
// Destroy after close (pairing closed it) is Gone: the one-window-one-action rule.
rec = httptest.NewRecorder()
h.Routes().ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/destroy",
bytes.NewBufferString(`{"password":"hunter2"}`)))
if rec.Code != http.StatusGone {
t.Fatalf("destroy after pairing got %d, want 410", rec.Code)
}
// A fresh window can destroy an existing device list.
h2 := openHandler(t, path, cfg)
cfg2 := config.File{}
raw, _ := os.ReadFile(path)
json.Unmarshal(raw, &cfg2)
h2 = openHandler(t, path, cfg2)
rec = httptest.NewRecorder()
h2.Routes().ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/destroy",
bytes.NewBufferString(`{"password":"hunter2"}`)))
if rec.Code != 200 {
t.Fatalf("destroy got %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body)
}
reloaded, err := config.LoadForPairing(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(reloaded.Devices) != 0 {
t.Fatal("destroy left devices behind")
}
}
func TestAnUnprotectedNodeNeedsAnExplicitSecret(t *testing.T) {
path, cfg, _ := agentConfig(t)
cfg.NodePassword = ""
if _, err := New(path, cfg, nil); err != ErrNoSecret {
t.Fatalf("got %v, want ErrNoSecret", err)
}
cfg.ProvisionSecret = "pair-only"
h, err := New(path, cfg, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("explicit secret was refused: %v", err)
}
signPub, kxPub := phoneKeys(t)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.Routes().ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/provision",
provisionBody(t, "pair-only", signPub, kxPub)))
if rec.Code != 200 {
t.Fatalf("status %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body)
}
}
func TestUnknownRoutesDoNotDescribeTheSurface(t *testing.T) {
path, cfg, _ := agentConfig(t)
h := openHandler(t, path, cfg)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.Routes().ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/provision", nil))
if rec.Code != http.StatusMethodNotAllowed && rec.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Fatalf("GET /provision got %d", rec.Code)
}
rec = httptest.NewRecorder()
h.Routes().ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/admin/list-devices", nil))
if rec.Code != http.StatusNotFound || len(rec.Body.Bytes()) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("unknown route leaked: %d %q", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
}
// Serve enforces the wall-clock deadline even if nobody ever pairs: a management socket that
// outlives the operator's session is the second hole the design forbids.
func TestServeDeadlineClosesTheWindow(t *testing.T) {
path, cfg, _ := agentConfig(t)
h := openHandler(t, path, cfg)
server := httptest.NewServer(h.Routes())
defer server.Close()
deadline := time.NewTimer(50 * time.Millisecond)
<-deadline.C
h.Close()
signPub, kxPub := phoneKeys(t)
response, err := http.Post(server.URL+"/provision", "application/json",
provisionBody(t, "hunter2", signPub, kxPub))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer response.Body.Close()
if response.StatusCode != http.StatusGone {
t.Fatalf("status after the deadline: %d", response.StatusCode)
}
}
// The window's default bind has to satisfy two things at once, and they pull in opposite directions.
//
// It must be reachable from the phone: pairing happens over the LAN by design, so a loopback default
// would be a flow that never works. And it must be a literal rather than a name: a name is resolved at
// bind time, so the listening address would depend on what DNS said, which is not a decision the
// operator made.
func TestTheDefaultBindIsALiteralAndIsReachableFromTheLAN(t *testing.T) {
if net.ParseIP(DefaultAdminHost) == nil {
t.Fatalf("%q is not an IP literal; a name would be resolved at bind time", DefaultAdminHost)
}
ip := net.ParseIP(DefaultAdminHost)
if ip.IsLoopback() {
t.Fatal("a loopback default cannot be reached from the phone, and pairing is a LAN flow")
}
// Any-address is the default because the documented flow requires it; the operator narrows it with
// --pair-bind when the node is routable from somewhere it should not be.
if !ip.IsUnspecified() {
t.Fatalf("the default bind changed to %q; the documented flow and the deployment notes assume %q",
DefaultAdminHost, "0.0.0.0")
}
}