agent 不持有运维令牌——节点不是运维,一个能删掉邻居的被控节点比它解决的问题更糟——所以 它不能自己从中继上摘掉自己。此前卸载的结束语对所有节点都写"the relay's agents.json still lists this node",而自注册的节点根本不在那里:它在中继的状态文件里,要从手机上删。运维照着 那句话去翻一个没有这条记录的文件。 现在节点在登记时把来历写进配置(`selfEnrolled`,带 `--code` 为真),卸载结束语据此给出 正确的那一句: - 自注册的 → "在中继的登记状态里,去 App 的「中继节点」移除" - 手工登记的 → "在 agents.json 里,删掉那条并重启中继" - 配置读不出来 → 两句都提,因为读不到不是让卸载失败的理由 测试两项:卸载打印的是它被告知的那一句(且不再对自注册节点说 agents.json)、登记时正确 记录来历(带码为真、不带码不写这个字段)。 Go 全包、Node 141 项、Swift 121 项通过。
263 lines
10 KiB
Go
263 lines
10 KiB
Go
// Package config loads the agent's startup file.
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//
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// The shape is deliberately small and has no host field. The local SimAdmin is reached by port
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// number alone: a config entry naming a host would be the one thing standing between a mistyped
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// value and an agent that proxies commands to somebody else's machine.
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package config
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import (
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"bytes"
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"crypto/rand"
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"encoding/hex"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"os"
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"regexp"
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"syscall"
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)
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var nodePattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^nd_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,64}$`)
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var appPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^ap_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,64}$`)
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// Device is a paired phone.
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type Device struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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// SignKey is the phone's Ed25519 public key, base64. The agent verifies every request against
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// it and holds no corresponding secret, so a phone cannot be impersonated from the relay side.
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SignKey string `json:"signKey"`
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Name string `json:"name,omitempty"`
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// RelayToken is the bearer credential the phone presents to the relay for this pairing. The
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// agent generated it at pairing time and re-registers it with the relay on every handshake,
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// because the relay holds no state across restarts.
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RelayToken string `json:"relayToken,omitempty"`
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}
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// File is the on-disk shape.
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type File struct {
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NodeID string `json:"nodeId"`
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// RelayURL is https and is the only outbound destination.
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RelayURL string `json:"relayUrl"`
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// AgentToken is the relay bearer credential. It authorises nothing on its own; the challenge
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// signature does the identifying.
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AgentToken string `json:"agentToken"`
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// LocalPort is the SimAdmin port on 127.0.0.1. There is deliberately no host field.
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LocalPort int `json:"localPort"`
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// SignKey is the agent's Ed25519 private key, base64.
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SignKey string `json:"signKey"`
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// KxKey is the agent's X25519 private key, base64.
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KxKey string `json:"kxKey"`
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// NodePassword is the local SimAdmin password the agent logs in with so the phone never
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// handles or transmits it. Empty declares the node unprotected; a protected node then refuses
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// commands with node_auth_failed rather than looping against a lockout.
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NodePassword string `json:"nodePassword,omitempty"`
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// RelayCAFile is a PEM bundle to trust instead of the system store when verifying the relay's
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// certificate. It exists for a relay behind a private CA; the default is the system store, which
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// is what a public certificate needs. Setting it pins trust rather than disabling verification.
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RelayCAFile string `json:"relayCAFile,omitempty"`
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// SelfEnrolled records that this node registered itself with the relay using a one-time code,
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// rather than being written into the relay's agents.json by an operator.
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//
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// It exists so `uninstall` can tell the operator which of two removals applies, because the agent
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// cannot do either: it holds no admin token, by design — a node is not an operator, and giving it
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// one would let a compromised node remove its neighbours. So the node records which half of the
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// relay's state mentions it, and the operator is told exactly what to delete.
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SelfEnrolled bool `json:"selfEnrolled,omitempty"`
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// AuditPath is where the audit log is appended.
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AuditPath string `json:"auditPath"`
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// Devices may be empty only in pair mode (--pair). In normal operation an agent with no
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// paired devices refuses to start, because it could authorise nothing.
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Devices []Device `json:"devices"`
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// ProvisionSecret is the shared secret a phone must present to pair during the temporary
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// --pair window (design §7 step 2, "以节点密码作为共享秘密"). When the node is protected it
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// defaults to NodePassword; an unprotected node needs an explicit value here or pairing is
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// refused. It is secret material and lives in the config file like the private keys do.
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ProvisionSecret string `json:"provisionSecret,omitempty"`
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}
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// Validate checks every field the agent depends on.
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//
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// pairMode relaxes exactly one rule: devices may be empty while the agent is waiting to be
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// paired. Everything else stays enforced, because a pair-mode agent with a broken nodeId or a
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// missing key would pair successfully and then command nothing.
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func (c File) Validate(pairMode bool) error {
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if !nodePattern.MatchString(c.NodeID) {
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return errors.New("nodeId must look like nd_xxxxxxxx")
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}
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if c.RelayURL == "" {
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return errors.New("relayUrl is required")
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}
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if c.AgentToken == "" {
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return errors.New("agentToken is required")
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}
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if c.LocalPort <= 0 || c.LocalPort > 65535 {
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return fmt.Errorf("localPort %d is out of range", c.LocalPort)
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}
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if c.SignKey == "" {
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return errors.New("signKey is required")
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}
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if c.KxKey == "" {
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return errors.New("kxKey is required")
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}
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if c.AuditPath == "" {
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return errors.New("auditPath is required")
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}
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if len(c.Devices) == 0 && !pairMode {
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return errors.New("devices is empty, so no phone could ever be authorised")
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}
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seen := map[string]bool{}
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for _, device := range c.Devices {
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if !appPattern.MatchString(device.ID) {
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return fmt.Errorf("device id %q must look like ap_xxxxxxxx", device.ID)
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}
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if device.SignKey == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("device %q has no signKey", device.ID)
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}
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if seen[device.ID] {
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return fmt.Errorf("device %q is listed twice", device.ID)
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}
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seen[device.ID] = true
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Load reads a config file for the normal (commanding) mode.
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func Load(path string) (File, error) {
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cfg, err := loadFile(path)
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if err != nil {
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return cfg, err
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}
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if err := cfg.Validate(false); err != nil {
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return cfg, fmt.Errorf("config: %s: %w", path, err)
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}
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return cfg, nil
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}
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// LoadForPairing reads a config file for --pair mode, where an empty device list is the starting
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// state rather than a misconfiguration.
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func LoadForPairing(path string) (File, error) {
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cfg, err := loadFile(path)
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if err != nil {
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return cfg, err
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}
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if err := cfg.Validate(true); err != nil {
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return cfg, fmt.Errorf("config: %s: %w", path, err)
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}
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return cfg, nil
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}
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func loadFile(path string) (File, error) {
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var cfg File
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raw, err := os.ReadFile(path)
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if err != nil {
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return cfg, fmt.Errorf("config: %w", err)
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}
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decoder := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(raw))
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if err := decoder.Decode(&cfg); err != nil {
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return cfg, fmt.Errorf("config: decode %s: %w", path, err)
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}
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return cfg, nil
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}
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// Save writes the config back with 0600, atomically, preserving the file's owner.
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//
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// Atomic (temp file + rename) because the pairing flow writes the device list at moments when the
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// agent may be concurrently read by systemd restarts: a half-written config is a config that fails
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// to load, which turns a completed pairing into an uncommandable node.
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//
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// Ownership is preserved because the deployment document tells the operator to run `--pair` with
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// sudo, and the installed config belongs to the `msa-agent` user. Writing a temp file as root and
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// renaming it over the config would leave it root-owned 0600, and the systemd unit — which runs as
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// `msa-agent` — could then no longer read it: the pairing would appear to succeed and the node would
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// come up unable to load its own configuration. The chown is only attempted when the process can
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// perform it (root), and a failure is an error rather than a warning, because silently leaving the
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// file unreadable by the service is the failure this is here to prevent.
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func Save(path string, cfg File) error {
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if err := cfg.Validate(true); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("config: refusing to save an invalid file: %w", err)
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}
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encoded, err := json.MarshalIndent(cfg, "", " ")
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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encoded = append(encoded, '\n')
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uid, gid, hadOwner := ownerOf(path)
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temp := path + ".tmp"
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if err := os.WriteFile(temp, encoded, 0o600); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if hadOwner && os.Geteuid() == 0 {
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if err := os.Chown(temp, uid, gid); err != nil {
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// The temp file is removed so a failed save leaves no stray copy of the config — it
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// holds the agent's private keys and the node password.
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os.Remove(temp)
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return fmt.Errorf("config: preserving ownership of %s: %w", path, err)
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}
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}
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return os.Rename(temp, path)
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}
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// ownerOf reports the uid and gid a rewrite of path must keep. ok is false when the file does not
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// exist yet, which is the first-write case: there is no owner to preserve, and the file is created
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// by whoever is running.
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func ownerOf(path string) (uid, gid int, ok bool) {
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info, err := os.Stat(path)
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if err != nil {
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return 0, 0, false
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}
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stat, ok := info.Sys().(*syscall.Stat_t)
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if !ok {
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return 0, 0, false
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}
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return int(stat.Uid), int(stat.Gid), true
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}
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// NewRelayToken mints a device bearer for the relay: 24 random bytes, hex. Hex because the relay
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// only requires a bearer string and hex never contains a character that needs escaping when it
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// travels through JSON or headers.
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func NewRelayToken() string {
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raw := make([]byte, 24)
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if _, err := rand.Read(raw); err != nil {
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// rand.Read only fails if the system entropy source is gone, in which case nothing in the
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// agent can run safely anyway.
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panic(fmt.Sprintf("config: entropy source failed: %v", err))
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}
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return hex.EncodeToString(raw)
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}
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// NewDeviceID mints an app id for a freshly paired phone. The relay and the agent both match ids
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// against ^ap_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,64}$, so 12 hex characters is the narrowest thing that fits.
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func NewDeviceID() string {
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raw := make([]byte, 6)
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if _, err := rand.Read(raw); err != nil {
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panic(fmt.Sprintf("config: entropy source failed: %v", err))
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}
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return "ap_" + hex.EncodeToString(raw)
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}
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// EnsureRelayTokens fills in bearer tokens for hand-written device entries that lack one and
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// persists the result. It reports whether the file changed so a caller can log the event rather
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// than silently rewriting an operator's file on every boot.
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func EnsureRelayTokens(path string) (File, bool, error) {
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cfg, err := loadFile(path)
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if err != nil {
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return cfg, false, err
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}
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if err := cfg.Validate(false); err != nil {
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return cfg, false, fmt.Errorf("config: %s: %w", path, err)
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}
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changed := false
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for i := range cfg.Devices {
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if cfg.Devices[i].RelayToken == "" {
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cfg.Devices[i].RelayToken = NewRelayToken()
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changed = true
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}
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}
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if changed {
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if err := Save(path, cfg); err != nil {
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return cfg, false, err
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}
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}
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return cfg, changed, nil
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}
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