agent 不持有运维令牌——节点不是运维,一个能删掉邻居的被控节点比它解决的问题更糟——所以 它不能自己从中继上摘掉自己。此前卸载的结束语对所有节点都写"the relay's agents.json still lists this node",而自注册的节点根本不在那里:它在中继的状态文件里,要从手机上删。运维照着 那句话去翻一个没有这条记录的文件。 现在节点在登记时把来历写进配置(`selfEnrolled`,带 `--code` 为真),卸载结束语据此给出 正确的那一句: - 自注册的 → "在中继的登记状态里,去 App 的「中继节点」移除" - 手工登记的 → "在 agents.json 里,删掉那条并重启中继" - 配置读不出来 → 两句都提,因为读不到不是让卸载失败的理由 测试两项:卸载打印的是它被告知的那一句(且不再对自注册节点说 agents.json)、登记时正确 记录来历(带码为真、不带码不写这个字段)。 Go 全包、Node 141 项、Swift 121 项通过。
169 lines
6.3 KiB
Go
169 lines
6.3 KiB
Go
package enroll
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import (
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"crypto/ed25519"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/json"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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)
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// The two artefacts have to agree, and that agreement is the whole reason this is a package rather
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// than two commands: the config carries the private signing key, the registration carries the public
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// one, and a node whose relay entry was minted from a different key pair authenticates nowhere.
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func TestTheConfigAndTheRegistrationDescribeTheSameNode(t *testing.T) {
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result, err := Generate(Options{
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RelayURL: "https://relay.example",
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LocalPort: 3000,
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AuditPath: "/var/log/msa-agent/audit.log",
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})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Generate: %v", err)
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}
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var cfg struct {
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NodeID string `json:"nodeId"`
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RelayURL string `json:"relayUrl"`
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AgentToken string `json:"agentToken"`
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LocalPort int `json:"localPort"`
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SignKey string `json:"signKey"`
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KxKey string `json:"kxKey"`
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AuditPath string `json:"auditPath"`
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Devices []any `json:"devices"`
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}
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if err := json.Unmarshal(result.Config, &cfg); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("the config is not valid JSON: %v", err)
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}
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var reg Registration
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if err := json.Unmarshal(result.Registration, ®); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("the registration is not valid JSON: %v", err)
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}
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if cfg.NodeID != reg.NodeID || cfg.NodeID != result.NodeID {
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t.Fatalf("node ids disagree: config=%q registration=%q result=%q", cfg.NodeID, reg.NodeID, result.NodeID)
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}
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if cfg.AgentToken != reg.Token {
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t.Fatal("the config's bearer and the registration's token differ; the agent would 401")
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}
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if cfg.RelayURL != "https://relay.example" || cfg.LocalPort != 3000 {
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t.Fatalf("relay or port lost: %+v", cfg)
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}
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if cfg.Devices == nil || len(cfg.Devices) != 0 {
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t.Fatalf("devices must start empty, got %v", cfg.Devices)
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}
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// The private key is 64 bytes; its last 32 are the public key, which is what the relay verifies.
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private, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(cfg.SignKey)
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if err != nil || len(private) != ed25519.PrivateKeySize {
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t.Fatalf("signKey is not a base64 ed25519 private key: %v (%d bytes)", err, len(private))
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}
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public, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(reg.SignKey)
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if err != nil || len(public) != ed25519.PublicKeySize {
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t.Fatalf("the registration's signKey is not a base64 ed25519 public key: %v (%d bytes)", err, len(public))
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}
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if string(private[ed25519.PrivateKeySize-ed25519.PublicKeySize:]) != string(public) {
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t.Fatal("the relay's registration carries a key that does not belong to the config's private key")
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}
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}
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// The node password is the one secret this tool must not invent. An unprotected node needs no value;
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// a protected one needs the real one, or every command fails with node_auth_failed and the cause is
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// not obvious from the phone.
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func TestTheNodePasswordIsOnlyWrittenWhenGiven(t *testing.T) {
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without, err := Generate(Options{RelayURL: "https://relay.example", LocalPort: 3000, AuditPath: "/a"})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if strings.Contains(string(without.Config), "nodePassword") {
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t.Fatal("a config with no password claims one")
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}
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with, err := Generate(Options{
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RelayURL: "https://relay.example", LocalPort: 3000, AuditPath: "/a", NodePassword: "hunter2",
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})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if !strings.Contains(string(with.Config), `"nodePassword": "hunter2"`) {
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t.Fatal("the given password was not written")
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}
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}
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// Re-enrolling a node has to be able to keep the identifiers the relay already knows, or the operator
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// has two edits to make instead of one.
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func TestGivenIdentifiersAreKept(t *testing.T) {
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result, err := Generate(Options{
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RelayURL: "https://relay.example", LocalPort: 3000, AuditPath: "/a",
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NodeID: "nd_keepme0001", AgentToken: strings.Repeat("a", 64), ProvisionSecret: "kept-secret",
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})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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var reg Registration
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if err := json.Unmarshal(result.Registration, ®); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if reg.NodeID != "nd_keepme0001" || reg.Token != strings.Repeat("a", 64) {
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t.Fatalf("identifiers were regenerated: %+v", reg)
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}
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if result.ProvisionSecret != "kept-secret" {
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t.Fatal("the pairing secret was regenerated")
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}
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}
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// Two enrollments must not produce the same keys or ids. A generator that repeated a key would make
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// two nodes able to impersonate each other, and it is the kind of bug a seeded RNG introduces once.
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func TestTwoEnrollmentsDiffer(t *testing.T) {
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first, err := Generate(Options{RelayURL: "https://relay.example", LocalPort: 3000, AuditPath: "/a"})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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second, err := Generate(Options{RelayURL: "https://relay.example", LocalPort: 3000, AuditPath: "/a"})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if first.NodeID == second.NodeID {
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t.Fatal("two enrollments produced the same node id")
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}
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if string(first.Config) == string(second.Config) {
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t.Fatal("two enrollments produced the same config, so the same keys")
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}
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}
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func TestMissingInputIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
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cases := map[string]Options{
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"no relay": {LocalPort: 3000, AuditPath: "/a"},
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"bad port": {RelayURL: "https://relay.example", LocalPort: 0, AuditPath: "/a"},
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"huge port": {RelayURL: "https://relay.example", LocalPort: 70000, AuditPath: "/a"},
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"no audit": {RelayURL: "https://relay.example", LocalPort: 3000},
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}
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for name, opts := range cases {
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if _, err := Generate(opts); err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("%s was accepted", name)
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}
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}
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}
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// The node records how it got into the relay, because `uninstall` cannot work it out any other way: the
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// agent holds no admin token, so it cannot remove its own entry, and the operator has to be told which
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// of the relay's two records mentions this node.
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func TestEnrollmentRecordsItsOwnProvenance(t *testing.T) {
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withCode, err := Generate(Options{
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RelayURL: "https://relay.example", LocalPort: 3000, AuditPath: "/a", SelfEnrolled: true,
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})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if !strings.Contains(string(withCode.Config), `"selfEnrolled": true`) {
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t.Fatal("a self-enrolled node does not say so")
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}
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// And a node an operator wrote into agents.json does not claim to have enrolled itself, or the
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// uninstall would send the operator to the app to remove an entry that is not there.
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manual, err := Generate(Options{RelayURL: "https://relay.example", LocalPort: 3000, AuditPath: "/a"})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if strings.Contains(string(manual.Config), "selfEnrolled") {
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t.Fatal("a manually registered node claims to be self-enrolled")
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}
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}
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