perf,feat(events),hardening: second review pass

Fleet overview N+1:
- InstanceResourceService gains a 30s TTL cache with single-flight
  coalescing; the overview no longer fires six live upstream requests per
  device on every render (plus the re-login storm), while the per-device
  detail route probes live via force:true

Event journal becomes live:
- job terminal transitions (manual executions and the interrupted sweep)
  now append to the journal, so /api/v1/events SSE feeds the frontend's
  invalidation controller that was built but never received events
- journal pruning moves off the append hot path (was an unindexable
  full-table json_extract scan per insert) onto the retention timer

Console auth hardening:
- scrypt upgraded from N=16384 to N=2^16 (OWASP interactive guidance);
  a new password_kdf column records the derivation per row and legacy
  hashes rehash transparently on the next successful login without
  invalidating sessions (migration 18)

Legacy stack:
- instance URL validation blocks IPv4-compatible IPv6 after WHATWG
  canonicalization (::a9fe:a9fe metadata, ::7f00:1 loopback slipped past)
- status polls cool down auto-login for 60s after a failed attempt so a
  stale saved password cannot hammer the device into an account lockout

Build hygiene:
- web bundle splits app (410kB) from vendor (212kB) so framework code
  stays cacheable across releases; stale root package-lock.json removed
  (pnpm is the only lockfile)

README.md

@@ -80,10 +80,12 @@ sh /tmp/multi-simadmin-install.sh uninstall
 
 ```bash
 cp config.example.json config.json
-npm install
+corepack pnpm install
-npm start
+corepack pnpm start
 ```
 
+> 仓库统一使用 pnpm（`pnpm-lock.yaml`）作为唯一 lockfile；陈旧的 `package-lock.json` 已移除。
+
 ## 配置
 
 编辑 `config.json`：

apps/api/src/application/auth/console-auth-service.ts

@@ -6,6 +6,25 @@ const SESSION_TTL_MS = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
 const MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH = 8;
 const MAX_PASSWORD_BYTES = 1024;
 const SCRYPT_KEY_LENGTH = 32;
+// Legacy derivations used N=16384; OWASP guidance for interactive login sits at
+// N=2^16/r=8. Rows keep their derivation tag so verification stays correct and
+// the upgrade happens transparently on the next successful login.
+interface ScryptParams {
+  readonly N: number;
+  readonly r: number;
+  readonly p: number;
+}
+const SCRYPT_LEGACY: ScryptParams = { N: 16_384, r: 8, p: 1 };
+const SCRYPT_CURRENT: ScryptParams = { N: 65_536, r: 8, p: 1 };
+const SCRYPT_MAXMEM = 256 * 1024 * 1024;
+const scryptTag = (params: ScryptParams): string => `scrypt:${params.N}:${params.r}:${params.p}`;
+const parseScryptTag = (value: string | null | undefined): ScryptParams => {
+  if (!value) return SCRYPT_LEGACY;
+  const match = /^scrypt:(\d+):(\d+):(\d+)$/.exec(value);
+  if (!match) return SCRYPT_LEGACY;
+  const [N, r, p] = match.slice(1).map(Number) as [number, number, number];
+  return { N, r, p };
+};
 const IDLE_TIMEOUT_SETTING_KEY = 'console-auth.idle-timeout-minutes';
 const DEFAULT_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MINUTES = 30;
 const MIN_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MINUTES = 5;
@@ -16,6 +35,7 @@ interface AuthConfigRow {
   readonly password_salt: string | null;
   readonly password_hash: string | null;
   readonly password_revision: number;
+  readonly password_kdf: string | null;
 }
 
 export interface ConsoleAuthStatus {
@@ -87,10 +107,23 @@ export class ConsoleAuthService {
       !config.password_hash
     )
       throw new ConsoleAuthError('INVALID_CREDENTIALS');
-    const actual = await this.derive(password, config.password_salt);
+    const params = parseScryptTag(config.password_kdf);
+    const actual = await this.derive(password, config.password_salt, params);
     const expected = Buffer.from(config.password_hash, 'hex');
     if (actual.length !== expected.length || !timingSafeEqual(actual, expected))
       throw new ConsoleAuthError('INVALID_CREDENTIALS');
+    if (params !== SCRYPT_CURRENT) {
+      // Transparent upgrade: same salt, stronger derivation, same revision so
+      // live sessions survive.
+      const hash = (await this.derive(password, config.password_salt, SCRYPT_CURRENT)).toString(
+        'hex',
+      );
+      this.db
+        .prepare(
+          'UPDATE console_auth_config SET password_hash=?,password_kdf=?,updated_at=? WHERE singleton=1',
+        )
+        .run(hash, scryptTag(SCRYPT_CURRENT), this.now().toISOString());
+    }
     return this.createSession(config.password_revision);
   }
 
@@ -121,14 +154,14 @@ export class ConsoleAuthService {
           this.db
             .prepare(
               `INSERT INTO console_auth_config
-                (singleton,protection_enabled,password_salt,password_hash,password_revision,updated_at)
+                (singleton,protection_enabled,password_salt,password_hash,password_revision,password_kdf,updated_at)
-               VALUES (1,1,?,?,?,?)
+               VALUES (1,1,?,?,?,?,?)
                ON CONFLICT(singleton) DO UPDATE SET
                  protection_enabled=1,password_salt=excluded.password_salt,
                  password_hash=excluded.password_hash,password_revision=excluded.password_revision,
-                 updated_at=excluded.updated_at`,
+                 password_kdf=excluded.password_kdf,updated_at=excluded.updated_at`,
             )
-            .run(salt, hash, revision, this.now().toISOString());
+            .run(salt, hash, revision, scryptTag(SCRYPT_CURRENT), this.now().toISOString());
           this.db.prepare('DELETE FROM console_auth_sessions').run();
           return this.createSession(revision);
         })();
@@ -178,7 +211,7 @@ export class ConsoleAuthService {
   private config(): AuthConfigRow | undefined {
     return this.db
       .prepare(
-        `SELECT protection_enabled,password_salt,password_hash,password_revision
+        `SELECT protection_enabled,password_salt,password_hash,password_revision,password_kdf
          FROM console_auth_config WHERE singleton=1`,
       )
       .get() as AuthConfigRow | undefined;
@@ -221,13 +254,17 @@ export class ConsoleAuthService {
       throw new ConsoleAuthError('PASSWORD_POLICY_FAILED');
   }
 
-  private derive(password: string, salt: string): Promise<Buffer> {
+  private derive(
+    password: string,
+    salt: string,
+    params: ScryptParams = SCRYPT_CURRENT,
+  ): Promise<Buffer> {
     return new Promise((resolvePromise, reject) => {
       deriveScrypt(
         password,
         Buffer.from(salt, 'hex'),
         SCRYPT_KEY_LENGTH,
-        { N: 16_384, r: 8, p: 1, maxmem: 64 * 1024 * 1024 },
+        { ...params, maxmem: SCRYPT_MAXMEM },
         (error, derivedKey) => {
           if (error) reject(error);
           else resolvePromise(derivedKey);

apps/api/src/application/events/event-journal.ts

@@ -185,7 +185,6 @@ export class EventJournal {
     const sequence = Number(result.lastInsertRowid);
     if (!Number.isSafeInteger(sequence))
       throw new Error('event journal sequence is not a safe integer');
-    this.#prune();
     const appended = { sequence, envelope };
     for (const subscriber of [...this.#subscribers]) subscriber(appended);
     return appended;
@@ -236,7 +235,11 @@ export class EventJournal {
     };
   }
 
-  #prune(): void {
+  /**
+   * Maintenance hook for a periodic timer. Pruning per append turned every
+   * insert into an unindexable full-table json_extract scan.
+   */
+  prune(): void {
     const cutoff = new Date(Date.now() - this.#retentionMs).toISOString();
     this.#database
       .prepare("DELETE FROM event_journal WHERE json_extract(envelope_json, '$.occurredAt') < ?")

apps/api/src/application/operations/secure-operation-execution.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import type Database from 'better-sqlite3';
 import { createHash, randomBytes, randomUUID, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
+import type { EventEnvelope } from '../events/event-journal.js';
 import type {
   ExecuteOperationRequest,
   Job,
@@ -121,6 +122,8 @@ interface Options {
   readonly idFactory?: () => string;
   readonly tokenFactory?: () => string;
   readonly nonceFactory?: () => string;
+  /** Receives job terminal transitions so the SSE journal has a live producer. */
+  readonly emit?: (envelope: EventEnvelope) => void;
 }
 interface PreparationRow {
   operation_id: string;
@@ -442,6 +445,7 @@ export class SecureOperationExecution {
       }
     }
     this.finish(ids, state, code);
+    this.#emitTerminal(ids.job, state, requestId);
     return this.job(ids.job);
   }
 
@@ -453,7 +457,10 @@ export class SecureOperationExecution {
           "SELECT id FROM jobs WHERE operation_id IN ('postNetworkRegisterAuto','postServiceRestart','postBasebandRestart','postSystemReboot') AND risk_level IN ('R2','R3') AND status='running'",
         )
         .all() as Array<{ id: string }>;
-      for (const row of jobs) this.finishByJob(row.id, now, 'unknown-result', 'INTERRUPTED');
+      for (const row of jobs) {
+        this.finishByJob(row.id, now, 'unknown-result', 'INTERRUPTED');
+        this.#emitTerminal(row.id, 'unknown-result', now);
+      }
       return jobs.length;
     })();
   }
@@ -479,6 +486,21 @@ export class SecureOperationExecution {
         .run(state, now, now, ids.job);
     })();
   }
+  #emitTerminal(jobId: string, state: string, requestId: string): void {
+    if (!this.options.emit) return;
+    try {
+      this.options.emit({
+        kind: 'job',
+        id: this.id(),
+        occurredAt: this.clock().toISOString(),
+        requestId,
+        jobId,
+      });
+    } catch {
+      // A journal failure must never fail the operation itself.
+    }
+  }
+
   private finishByJob(jobId: string, now: string, state: string, code: string): void {
     this.options.db
       .prepare(

apps/api/src/application/resources/instance-resource-service.test.ts

@@ -155,6 +155,66 @@ describe('instance resource allowlist parsing', () => {
     ).toEqual({ simPresent: true, phoneNumbers: ['+8613800000000'] });
   });
 
+  describe('overview cache', () => {
+    const minimal = (cacheTtlMs?: number) => {
+      const requests: Array<{ url: string }> = [];
+      const service = new InstanceResourceService({
+        instances: { get: async () => ({ origin: 'http://192.168.3.55:3000' }) } as never,
+        sessions: { sessionFor: () => undefined } as never,
+        request: async (request: { url: string }) => {
+          requests.push(request);
+          return request.url.endsWith('/api/device')
+            ? response({ data: { online: true } })
+            : { status: 503, headers: {}, body: '' };
+        },
+        ...(cacheTtlMs === undefined ? {} : { cacheTtlMs }),
+      } as never);
+      return { service, requests };
+    };
+
+    it('serves repeat overview reads from the TTL cache and refreshes after expiry', async () => {
+      let clock = 1_000;
+      const { service, requests } = minimal();
+      (service as unknown as { options: { now?: () => number } }).options.now = () => clock;
+
+      await service.get('device-1');
+      const firstPass = requests.length;
+      await service.get('device-1');
+      expect(requests.length).toBe(firstPass);
+      clock += 31_000;
+      await service.get('device-1');
+      expect(requests.length).toBeGreaterThan(firstPass);
+    });
+
+    it('coalesces concurrent overview reads into one upstream pass', async () => {
+      const { service, requests } = minimal();
+      await Promise.all([
+        service.get('device-1'),
+        service.get('device-1'),
+        service.get('device-1'),
+      ]);
+      expect(requests).toHaveLength(6);
+    });
+
+    it('probes live again when a detail view forces a refresh', async () => {
+      const clock = 5_000;
+      const { service, requests } = minimal();
+      (service as unknown as { options: { now?: () => number } }).options.now = () => clock;
+
+      await service.get('device-1');
+      const afterOverview = requests.length;
+      await service.get('device-1', { force: true });
+      expect(requests.length).toBe(afterOverview + 6);
+    });
+
+    it('keeps reads uncached when the TTL is disabled', async () => {
+      const { service, requests } = minimal(0);
+      await service.get('device-1');
+      await service.get('device-1');
+      expect(requests).toHaveLength(12);
+    });
+  });
+
   it('probes passwordless instances without manufacturing a cookie', async () => {
     const requests: Array<{ url: string; headers: Readonly<Record<string, string>> }> = [];
     const service = new InstanceResourceService({

apps/api/src/application/resources/instance-resource-service.ts

@@ -163,7 +163,15 @@ export function parseSignalStrength(response: UpstreamResponse): InstanceResourc
   return signalPercent === undefined ? {} : { signalPercent };
 }
 
+const DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL_MS = 30_000;
+
 export class InstanceResourceService {
+  readonly #cache = new Map<
+    string,
+    { readonly resources: InstanceResources; readonly fetchedAt: number }
+  >();
+  readonly #inflight = new Map<string, Promise<InstanceResources>>();
+
   constructor(
     private readonly options: {
       readonly instances: InstanceService;
@@ -174,10 +182,46 @@ export class InstanceResourceService {
         origin: string,
         force?: boolean,
       ) => Promise<void>;
+      /** Fleet overview fan-out reads through this cache; 0 disables it. */
+      readonly cacheTtlMs?: number;
+      readonly now?: () => number;
     },
   ) {}
 
-  async get(instanceId: string): Promise<InstanceResources> {
+  /**
+   * Fleet overview fans out one read per registered node; without a shared TTL
+   * that is six live upstream requests per device on every page render (plus a
+   * re-login storm when sessions expired). Detail views pass `force` to probe
+   * the selected device immediately.
+   */
+  async get(
+    instanceId: string,
+    { force = false }: { readonly force?: boolean } = {},
+  ): Promise<InstanceResources> {
+    const ttl = this.options.cacheTtlMs ?? DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL_MS;
+    const now = this.options.now?.() ?? Date.now();
+    if (ttl > 0 && !force) {
+      const cached = this.#cache.get(instanceId);
+      if (cached && now - cached.fetchedAt < ttl) return cached.resources;
+      const inflight = this.#inflight.get(instanceId);
+      if (inflight) return inflight;
+      const pending = this.#fetch(instanceId)
+        .then((resources) => {
+          this.#cache.set(instanceId, { resources, fetchedAt: this.options.now?.() ?? now });
+          return resources;
+        })
+        .finally(() => {
+          this.#inflight.delete(instanceId);
+        });
+      this.#inflight.set(instanceId, pending);
+      return pending;
+    }
+    const resources = await this.#fetch(instanceId);
+    if (ttl > 0) this.#cache.set(instanceId, { resources, fetchedAt: now });
+    return resources;
+  }
+
+  async #fetch(instanceId: string): Promise<InstanceResources> {
     const [instance, session] = await Promise.all([
       this.options.instances.get(instanceId),
       Promise.resolve(this.options.sessions.sessionFor(instanceId)),

apps/api/src/control-plane.ts

@@ -381,6 +381,7 @@ export function buildControlPlaneApp(options: ControlPlaneOptions): ControlPlane
   const secureExecution = new SecureOperationExecution({
     db: options.db,
     registry: secureOperationRegistry,
+    emit: (envelope) => eventJournal.append(envelope),
     transport: {
       request: async ({ origin, path, body, contentType, instanceId }) => {
         const cookie = await resolveOperationCookie(instanceId, origin);
@@ -586,6 +587,9 @@ export function buildControlPlaneApp(options: ControlPlaneOptions): ControlPlane
           void Promise.resolve()
             .then(() => smsOutbox.prune(30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000))
             .catch(() => undefined);
+          void Promise.resolve()
+            .then(() => eventJournal.prune())
+            .catch(() => undefined);
         }, logPruneIntervalMs)
       : undefined;
   // Scheduled component backups: the tick is cheap and only writes when a period is overdue.

apps/api/src/infrastructure/database/migrations.ts

@@ -670,6 +670,16 @@ export const MIGRATIONS: readonly Migration[] = [
       'CREATE INDEX idx_device_identities_imei ON device_identities(imei, instance_id)',
     ],
   },
+  {
+    id: 18,
+    name: 'console-auth-scrypt-params',
+    statements: [
+      // Legacy hashes were derived with N=16384; new derivations use stronger
+      // parameters. The column records the derivation per row; NULL means legacy
+      // and is transparently upgraded after the next successful login.
+      'ALTER TABLE console_auth_config ADD COLUMN password_kdf TEXT',
+    ],
+  },
 ];
 
 const createMigrationsTable = `CREATE TABLE schema_migrations (

apps/api/src/interface/http/console-auth-routes.test.ts

@@ -49,6 +49,49 @@ afterEach(async () => {
   for (const db of dbs.splice(0)) if (db.open) db.close();
 });
 
+async function seedLegacyHash(db: Database.Database, password: string): Promise<void> {
+  const { scrypt } = await import('node:crypto');
+  const salt = 'a'.repeat(32);
+  const hash = await new Promise<Buffer>((resolve, reject) =>
+    scrypt(password, Buffer.from(salt, 'hex'), 32, { N: 16_384, r: 8, p: 1 }, (error, key) =>
+      error ? reject(error) : resolve(key),
+    ),
+  );
+  db.prepare(
+    `INSERT INTO console_auth_config
+      (singleton,protection_enabled,password_salt,password_hash,password_revision,password_kdf,updated_at)
+     VALUES (1,1,?,?,1,NULL,?)`,
+  ).run(salt, hash.toString('hex'), new Date().toISOString());
+}
+
+describe('console password derivation upgrade', () => {
+  it('verifies a legacy N=16384 hash and transparently rehashes with current params', async () => {
+    const { app, db, auth } = fixture();
+    await seedLegacyHash(db, PASSWORD);
+
+    const before = db
+      .prepare('SELECT password_hash, password_kdf FROM console_auth_config WHERE singleton=1')
+      .get() as { password_hash: string; password_kdf: string | null };
+    expect(before.password_kdf).toBeNull();
+
+    const login = await app.inject({
+      method: 'POST',
+      url: '/api/v1/auth/login',
+      payload: { password: PASSWORD },
+    });
+    expect(login.statusCode).toBe(204);
+
+    const after = db
+      .prepare('SELECT password_hash, password_kdf FROM console_auth_config WHERE singleton=1')
+      .get() as { password_hash: string; password_kdf: string | null };
+    expect(after.password_kdf).toBe('scrypt:65536:8:1');
+    expect(after.password_hash).not.toBe(before.password_hash);
+
+    // The upgraded hash still verifies with a plain login through the service.
+    await expect(auth.login(PASSWORD)).resolves.toBeTruthy();
+  });
+});
+
 describe('aggregate-console password protection HTTP boundary', () => {
   it('starts migration-safe as disabled and never returns password material', async () => {
     const { app } = fixture();

apps/api/src/interface/http/instance-routes.ts

@@ -370,7 +370,10 @@ export function registerInstanceRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, options: InstanceRo
     app.get(
       '/api/v1/instances/:instanceId/resources',
       wrap(async (request) =>
-        options.resources!.get((request.params as { instanceId: string }).instanceId),
+        // A single selected device is the one place a live probe is expected.
+        options.resources!.get((request.params as { instanceId: string }).instanceId, {
+          force: true,
+        }),
       ),
     );
   if (options.messages) {

apps/web/vite.config.ts

@@ -4,6 +4,18 @@ import { defineConfig } from 'vite';
 
 export default defineConfig(({ mode }) => ({
   plugins: [react()],
+  build: {
+    rollupOptions: {
+      output: {
+        // Framework code changes far less often than app code; splitting keeps
+        // the vendor chunk cacheable across releases instead of one big bundle.
+        manualChunks(id) {
+          if (id.includes('node_modules')) return 'vendor';
+          return undefined;
+        },
+      },
+    },
+  },
   resolve: {
     alias:
       mode === 'test'

server/config/schema.js

@@ -14,7 +14,10 @@ export function normalizeBaseUrl(rawUrl) {
     (ipv4[0] === 169 && ipv4[1] === 254) ||
     (ipv4[0] >= 224)
   )
-  const prohibitedIpv6 = hostname === '::' || hostname === '::1' || /^fe[89ab][0-9a-f]:/.test(hostname) || hostname.startsWith('ff') || hostname.startsWith('::ffff:') || hostname.startsWith('64:ff9b:')
+  // WHATWG canonicalization turns ::127.0.0.1 into ::7f00:1 and ::169.254.169.254 into
+  // ::a9fe:a9fe; the IPv4-compatible form (:: <1-2 groups>) must be matched after
+  // canonicalization or it smuggles loopback/metadata targets past the list.
+  const prohibitedIpv6 = hostname === '::' || hostname === '::1' || /^::[0-9a-f]{1,4}(:[0-9a-f]{1,4})?$/.test(hostname) || /^fe[89ab][0-9a-f]:/.test(hostname) || hostname.startsWith('ff') || hostname.startsWith('::ffff:') || hostname.startsWith('64:ff9b:')
   const prohibitedMetadata = hostname === '100.100.100.200' || hostname === '168.63.129.16'
   const prohibitedTransition = hostname.startsWith('2002:')
   const isIpLiteral = isIP(hostname) !== 0

server/core.js

@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ export function createSimAdminClient(instance, { fetchImpl = fetch, timeoutMs =
   }
 
   let ephemeralSecret = ''
+  let lastFailedAutoLoginAt = 0
   async function ensureAuthenticated({ credential } = {}) {
     const status = await fetchJson('/api/auth/status')
     const auth = apiData(status.data) || {}
@@ -203,12 +204,20 @@ export function createSimAdminClient(instance, { fetchImpl = fetch, timeoutMs =
       return { configured: auth.configured ?? null, authenticated: false, loginAttempted: false, statusCode: status.status, reason: 'password_required' }
     }
     if (credential !== undefined) ephemeralSecret = ''
+    // Status polls auto-login with the saved password; without a cooldown a
+    // stale password turns every refresh into a fresh login attempt, which
+    // some devices punish with account lockouts.
+    if (credential === undefined && !ephemeralSecret && Date.now() - lastFailedAutoLoginAt < 60_000) {
+      return { configured: auth.configured ?? null, authenticated: false, loginAttempted: false, statusCode: status.status, reason: 'login_cooldown' }
+    }
     const login = await request('/api/auth/login', {
       method: 'POST',
       headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json', accept: 'application/json' },
       body: JSON.stringify({ password }),
     })
     if (credential !== undefined && login.ok) ephemeralSecret = password
+    if (login.ok) lastFailedAutoLoginAt = 0
+    else if (credential === undefined) lastFailedAutoLoginAt = Date.now()
     return { configured: auth.configured ?? null, authenticated: login.ok, loginAttempted: true, statusCode: login.status, reason: login.ok ? null : 'login_failed' }
   }