fix(agent): 危险写限流改为滑动窗口,与中继侧同一算法
节点侧的限流器此前也是固定窗口(按自然分钟重置计数器),而注释声称的性质是 "任意 60 秒内至多 N 次危险写"——与中继侧那个缺陷完全相同,只是这一侧还没有 人测过它。注释同样以该性质为由选择了固定窗口,所以代码与自己的理由相反。 现在两端是同一个算法:保留被放行的写时间戳,窗口满时最早那笔离开窗口才放行。 这两个限流器从两侧约束同一个操作(节点自己、以及中继对设备的预算),一侧比 另一侧宽一倍是那种要等到事后复盘才会被发现的不一致,所以保持一致比任何一侧 单独正确更重要。 测试里有一处值得记下来:这个性质不能按"花完预算、过一分钟、再花一次"来测—— 那样固定窗口也会通过,因为所有写都过期之后两种实现没有分歧。必须把预算花在 自然分钟边界**之前**,再断言边界之后一笔都放不进去。第一版就是这么写错的, 变异验证(把实现改回按自然分钟重置)没有失败,才发现测试本身没在测它。 内存代价同中继侧:每节点至多 N 个时间戳,而不是一个整数。 Go 全包、Node 112 项、Swift 101 项通过。
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@@ -277,31 +277,60 @@ func (e *Executor) record(envelope wire.Envelope, method, path string, status in
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})
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}
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// rateLimiter is a fixed-window counter. Deliberately not a token bucket: the property wanted is
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// "at most N dangerous writes in any 60 seconds", and a bucket's refill rate makes that harder to
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// state and to test.
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// rateLimiter is a sliding-window counter over the dangerous writes this node has performed.
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//
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// The property is "at most N dangerous writes in any 60 seconds", and the implementation has to be
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// that. It used to be a fixed window — a counter reset on a calendar minute — which is a different
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// property: spending the budget just before the boundary and again just after puts 2N writes inside a
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// few milliseconds. The comment above the old code argued for a fixed window *because* "a bucket's
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// refill rate makes it harder to state and to test", so the code contradicted its own stated reason;
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// a token bucket would not have satisfied the property either.
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//
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// The relay's per-device budget had the same defect and was fixed the same way (relay/src/budget.js).
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// Keeping the two in step matters more than either: they bound the same operation from two sides, and
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// a node whose limiter is twice as permissive as the relay's is a discrepancy nobody would notice
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// until an incident review.
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//
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// Memory is bounded by the limit — at most N timestamps — where the fixed window held one integer.
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type rateLimiter struct {
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mu sync.Mutex
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limit int
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window time.Duration
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start time.Time
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consumed int
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mu sync.Mutex
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limit int
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window time.Duration
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// accepted holds the timestamps of admitted writes, ascending. Anything older than the window is
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// dropped on the next call, so the slice never exceeds limit entries.
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accepted []time.Time
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}
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// TestDangerousWriteLimitDoesNotResetOnACalendarBoundary is the test for the property above: it spends
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// the budget one second before a calendar-minute boundary and asserts nothing is admitted just after
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// it. Written the obvious way — spend the budget, advance a minute, spend it again — the test passes
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// against a fixed window too, because both implementations agree once everything has aged out.
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func newRateLimiter(limit int, window time.Duration) *rateLimiter {
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return &rateLimiter{limit: limit, window: window}
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}
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// Allow reports whether a dangerous write may proceed, and records it if so.
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//
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// Unlike the relay's budget, this one does not return a retry hint, and that is a property of the wire
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// format rather than an omission: the agent answers inside `InnerResponse`, which carries a status, an
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// outcome class and a body, and the phone renders the class with a fixed sentence. There is nowhere to
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// put a wait without changing the envelope, and a hint that no layer can deliver is a number nobody
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// reads. The relay can return one because HTTP has a header for it.
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func (r *rateLimiter) Allow(now time.Time) bool {
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r.mu.Lock()
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defer r.mu.Unlock()
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if r.start.IsZero() || now.Sub(r.start) >= r.window {
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r.start = now
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r.consumed = 0
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cutoff := now.Add(-r.window)
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live := r.accepted[:0]
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for _, stamp := range r.accepted {
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if stamp.After(cutoff) {
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live = append(live, stamp)
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}
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}
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if r.consumed >= r.limit {
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r.accepted = live
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if len(r.accepted) >= r.limit {
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return false
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}
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r.consumed++
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r.accepted = append(r.accepted, now)
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return true
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}
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@@ -290,7 +290,9 @@ func TestDangerousWritesAreRateLimited(t *testing.T) {
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if allowed != limit {
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t.Fatalf("allowed %d dangerous writes, want exactly %d", allowed, limit)
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}
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// The window is fixed, not sliding: moving past it restores the full budget.
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// The window slides, so a write is admitted exactly when its predecessor leaves the window — not
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// all at once on a calendar boundary. These writes all happened at f.now, so the whole budget
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// frees one minute after that instant.
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f.advance(time.Minute)
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envelope := envelopeAt("nd_test0001", "bbbbbbbb-bbbb-4bbb-8bbb-bbbbbbbbbbbb", uint64(f.now.Unix()))
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if _, refusal := f.executor.Execute(context.Background(), envelope,
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@@ -299,6 +301,69 @@ func TestDangerousWritesAreRateLimited(t *testing.T) {
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}
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}
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// The property, stated as the defect it replaces.
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//
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// A fixed window — a counter reset on a calendar minute — admits 2N writes inside a few milliseconds
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// by spending one budget just before its boundary and the next just after. The relay's per-device
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// budget had exactly that flaw (see relay/src/budget.js), so the two limiters are now the same
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// algorithm; this test is what makes the node's half of that claim checkable rather than asserted.
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func TestDangerousWriteLimitDoesNotResetOnACalendarBoundary(t *testing.T) {
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f := newFixture(t, http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.WriteHeader(200)
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}))
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body := []byte(`{"phone_number":"+8613800000000","content":"hello"}`)
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intent, err := wire.IntentDigest("POST", "/api/sms/send", body)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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limit := testPolicy(t).Limits.DangerousWritesPerMinute
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attempt := 0
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send := func() bool {
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inner := wire.InnerRequest{Method: "POST", Path: "/api/sms/send", Body: body, Intent: intent}
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envelope := envelopeAt("nd_test0001", newReqID(attempt), uint64(f.now.Unix()))
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attempt++
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_, refusal := f.executor.Execute(context.Background(), envelope, inner)
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return refusal == nil
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}
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// Park the clock one second before a calendar-minute boundary, then spend the whole budget there.
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// The fixture starts at a round minute, so 59 seconds lands on :59 of that minute.
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f.advance(59 * time.Second)
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for i := 0; i < limit; i++ {
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if !send() {
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t.Fatalf("write %d inside the budget was refused", i)
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}
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}
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// Cross the boundary. A fixed window has just reset its counter and admits another full budget —
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// which is the defect this test exists for. A sliding one admits nothing: the writes are two
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// seconds old, and the window is 60.
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f.advance(2 * time.Second)
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admitted := 0
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for i := 0; i < limit; i++ {
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if send() {
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admitted++
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}
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}
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if admitted != 0 {
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t.Fatalf("%d writes were admitted across the calendar boundary; the window is not sliding", admitted)
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}
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// And the budget frees one write at a time as the earlier ones age out, not all at once: 58 more
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// seconds puts the writes from :59 past the window, so the full budget is available again.
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f.advance(58 * time.Second)
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admitted = 0
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for i := 0; i < limit; i++ {
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if send() {
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admitted++
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}
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}
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if admitted != limit {
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t.Fatalf("after the window, %d writes were admitted, want exactly %d", admitted, limit)
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}
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}
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func newReqID(i int) string {
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return "cccccccc-cccc-4ccc-8ccc-" + strings.Repeat("0", 11) + strconv.Itoa(i)
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}
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