fix(agent): 危险写限流改为滑动窗口，与中继侧同一算法

节点侧的限流器此前也是固定窗口（按自然分钟重置计数器），而注释声称的性质是
"任意 60 秒内至多 N 次危险写"——与中继侧那个缺陷完全相同，只是这一侧还没有
人测过它。注释同样以该性质为由选择了固定窗口，所以代码与自己的理由相反。

现在两端是同一个算法：保留被放行的写时间戳，窗口满时最早那笔离开窗口才放行。
这两个限流器从两侧约束同一个操作（节点自己、以及中继对设备的预算），一侧比
另一侧宽一倍是那种要等到事后复盘才会被发现的不一致，所以保持一致比任何一侧
单独正确更重要。

测试里有一处值得记下来：这个性质不能按"花完预算、过一分钟、再花一次"来测——
那样固定窗口也会通过，因为所有写都过期之后两种实现没有分歧。必须把预算花在
自然分钟边界**之前**，再断言边界之后一笔都放不进去。第一版就是这么写错的，
变异验证（把实现改回按自然分钟重置）没有失败，才发现测试本身没在测它。

内存代价同中继侧：每节点至多 N 个时间戳，而不是一个整数。

Go 全包、Node 112 项、Swift 101 项通过。

internal/runtime/executor.go

@@ -277,31 +277,60 @@ func (e *Executor) record(envelope wire.Envelope, method, path string, status in
 	})
 }
 
-// rateLimiter is a fixed-window counter. Deliberately not a token bucket: the property wanted is
+// rateLimiter is a sliding-window counter over the dangerous writes this node has performed.
-// "at most N dangerous writes in any 60 seconds", and a bucket's refill rate makes that harder to
+//
-// state and to test.
+// The property is "at most N dangerous writes in any 60 seconds", and the implementation has to be
+// that. It used to be a fixed window — a counter reset on a calendar minute — which is a different
+// property: spending the budget just before the boundary and again just after puts 2N writes inside a
+// few milliseconds. The comment above the old code argued for a fixed window *because* "a bucket's
+// refill rate makes it harder to state and to test", so the code contradicted its own stated reason;
+// a token bucket would not have satisfied the property either.
+//
+// The relay's per-device budget had the same defect and was fixed the same way (relay/src/budget.js).
+// Keeping the two in step matters more than either: they bound the same operation from two sides, and
+// a node whose limiter is twice as permissive as the relay's is a discrepancy nobody would notice
+// until an incident review.
+//
+// Memory is bounded by the limit — at most N timestamps — where the fixed window held one integer.
 type rateLimiter struct {
 	mu     sync.Mutex
 	limit  int
 	window time.Duration
-	start    time.Time
+	// accepted holds the timestamps of admitted writes, ascending. Anything older than the window is
-	consumed int
+	// dropped on the next call, so the slice never exceeds limit entries.
+	accepted []time.Time
 }
 
+// TestDangerousWriteLimitDoesNotResetOnACalendarBoundary is the test for the property above: it spends
+// the budget one second before a calendar-minute boundary and asserts nothing is admitted just after
+// it. Written the obvious way — spend the budget, advance a minute, spend it again — the test passes
+// against a fixed window too, because both implementations agree once everything has aged out.
+
 func newRateLimiter(limit int, window time.Duration) *rateLimiter {
 	return &rateLimiter{limit: limit, window: window}
 }
 
+// Allow reports whether a dangerous write may proceed, and records it if so.
+//
+// Unlike the relay's budget, this one does not return a retry hint, and that is a property of the wire
+// format rather than an omission: the agent answers inside `InnerResponse`, which carries a status, an
+// outcome class and a body, and the phone renders the class with a fixed sentence. There is nowhere to
+// put a wait without changing the envelope, and a hint that no layer can deliver is a number nobody
+// reads. The relay can return one because HTTP has a header for it.
 func (r *rateLimiter) Allow(now time.Time) bool {
 	r.mu.Lock()
 	defer r.mu.Unlock()
-	if r.start.IsZero() || now.Sub(r.start) >= r.window {
+	cutoff := now.Add(-r.window)
-		r.start = now
+	live := r.accepted[:0]
-		r.consumed = 0
+	for _, stamp := range r.accepted {
+		if stamp.After(cutoff) {
+			live = append(live, stamp)
 		}
-	if r.consumed >= r.limit {
+	}
+	r.accepted = live
+	if len(r.accepted) >= r.limit {
 		return false
 	}
-	r.consumed++
+	r.accepted = append(r.accepted, now)
 	return true
 }

internal/runtime/runtime_test.go

@@ -290,7 +290,9 @@ func TestDangerousWritesAreRateLimited(t *testing.T) {
 	if allowed != limit {
 		t.Fatalf("allowed %d dangerous writes, want exactly %d", allowed, limit)
 	}
-	// The window is fixed, not sliding: moving past it restores the full budget.
+	// The window slides, so a write is admitted exactly when its predecessor leaves the window — not
+	// all at once on a calendar boundary. These writes all happened at f.now, so the whole budget
+	// frees one minute after that instant.
 	f.advance(time.Minute)
 	envelope := envelopeAt("nd_test0001", "bbbbbbbb-bbbb-4bbb-8bbb-bbbbbbbbbbbb", uint64(f.now.Unix()))
 	if _, refusal := f.executor.Execute(context.Background(), envelope,
@@ -299,6 +301,69 @@ func TestDangerousWritesAreRateLimited(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// The property, stated as the defect it replaces.
+//
+// A fixed window — a counter reset on a calendar minute — admits 2N writes inside a few milliseconds
+// by spending one budget just before its boundary and the next just after. The relay's per-device
+// budget had exactly that flaw (see relay/src/budget.js), so the two limiters are now the same
+// algorithm; this test is what makes the node's half of that claim checkable rather than asserted.
+func TestDangerousWriteLimitDoesNotResetOnACalendarBoundary(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newFixture(t, http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		w.WriteHeader(200)
+	}))
+	body := []byte(`{"phone_number":"+8613800000000","content":"hello"}`)
+	intent, err := wire.IntentDigest("POST", "/api/sms/send", body)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	limit := testPolicy(t).Limits.DangerousWritesPerMinute
+
+	attempt := 0
+	send := func() bool {
+		inner := wire.InnerRequest{Method: "POST", Path: "/api/sms/send", Body: body, Intent: intent}
+		envelope := envelopeAt("nd_test0001", newReqID(attempt), uint64(f.now.Unix()))
+		attempt++
+		_, refusal := f.executor.Execute(context.Background(), envelope, inner)
+		return refusal == nil
+	}
+
+	// Park the clock one second before a calendar-minute boundary, then spend the whole budget there.
+	// The fixture starts at a round minute, so 59 seconds lands on :59 of that minute.
+	f.advance(59 * time.Second)
+	for i := 0; i < limit; i++ {
+		if !send() {
+			t.Fatalf("write %d inside the budget was refused", i)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Cross the boundary. A fixed window has just reset its counter and admits another full budget —
+	// which is the defect this test exists for. A sliding one admits nothing: the writes are two
+	// seconds old, and the window is 60.
+	f.advance(2 * time.Second)
+	admitted := 0
+	for i := 0; i < limit; i++ {
+		if send() {
+			admitted++
+		}
+	}
+	if admitted != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("%d writes were admitted across the calendar boundary; the window is not sliding", admitted)
+	}
+
+	// And the budget frees one write at a time as the earlier ones age out, not all at once: 58 more
+	// seconds puts the writes from :59 past the window, so the full budget is available again.
+	f.advance(58 * time.Second)
+	admitted = 0
+	for i := 0; i < limit; i++ {
+		if send() {
+			admitted++
+		}
+	}
+	if admitted != limit {
+		t.Fatalf("after the window, %d writes were admitted, want exactly %d", admitted, limit)
+	}
+}
+
 func newReqID(i int) string {
 	return "cccccccc-cccc-4ccc-8ccc-" + strings.Repeat("0", 11) + strconv.Itoa(i)
 }