msa-agent/internal/config/config.go

// Package config loads the agent's startup file.
//
// The shape is deliberately small and has no host field. The local SimAdmin is reached by port
// number alone: a config entry naming a host would be the one thing standing between a mistyped
// value and an agent that proxies commands to somebody else's machine.
package config

import (
	"bytes"
	"crypto/rand"
	"encoding/hex"
	"encoding/json"
	"errors"
	"fmt"
	"os"
	"regexp"
)

var nodePattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^nd_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,64}$`)
var appPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^ap_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,64}$`)

// Device is a paired phone.
type Device struct {
	ID string `json:"id"`
	// SignKey is the phone's Ed25519 public key, base64. The agent verifies every request against
	// it and holds no corresponding secret, so a phone cannot be impersonated from the relay side.
	SignKey string `json:"signKey"`
	Name    string `json:"name,omitempty"`
	// RelayToken is the bearer credential the phone presents to the relay for this pairing. The
	// agent generated it at pairing time and re-registers it with the relay on every handshake,
	// because the relay holds no state across restarts.
	RelayToken string `json:"relayToken,omitempty"`
}

// File is the on-disk shape.
type File struct {
	NodeID string `json:"nodeId"`
	// RelayURL is https and is the only outbound destination.
	RelayURL string `json:"relayUrl"`
	// AgentToken is the relay bearer credential. It authorises nothing on its own; the challenge
	// signature does the identifying.
	AgentToken string `json:"agentToken"`
	// LocalPort is the SimAdmin port on 127.0.0.1. There is deliberately no host field.
	LocalPort int `json:"localPort"`
	// SignKey is the agent's Ed25519 private key, base64.
	SignKey string `json:"signKey"`
	// KxKey is the agent's X25519 private key, base64.
	KxKey string `json:"kxKey"`
	// NodePassword is the local SimAdmin password the agent logs in with so the phone never
	// handles or transmits it. Empty declares the node unprotected; a protected node then refuses
	// commands with node_auth_failed rather than looping against a lockout.
	NodePassword string `json:"nodePassword,omitempty"`
	// AuditPath is where the audit log is appended.
	AuditPath string `json:"auditPath"`
	// Devices may be empty only in pair mode (--pair). In normal operation an agent with no
	// paired devices refuses to start, because it could authorise nothing.
	Devices []Device `json:"devices"`
	// ProvisionSecret is the shared secret a phone must present to pair during the temporary
	// --pair window (design §7 step 2, "以节点密码作为共享秘密"). When the node is protected it
	// defaults to NodePassword; an unprotected node needs an explicit value here or pairing is
	// refused. It is secret material and lives in the config file like the private keys do.
	ProvisionSecret string `json:"provisionSecret,omitempty"`
}

// Validate checks every field the agent depends on.
//
// pairMode relaxes exactly one rule: devices may be empty while the agent is waiting to be
// paired. Everything else stays enforced, because a pair-mode agent with a broken nodeId or a
// missing key would pair successfully and then command nothing.
func (c File) Validate(pairMode bool) error {
	if !nodePattern.MatchString(c.NodeID) {
		return errors.New("nodeId must look like nd_xxxxxxxx")
	}
	if c.RelayURL == "" {
		return errors.New("relayUrl is required")
	}
	if c.AgentToken == "" {
		return errors.New("agentToken is required")
	}
	if c.LocalPort <= 0 || c.LocalPort > 65535 {
		return fmt.Errorf("localPort %d is out of range", c.LocalPort)
	}
	if c.SignKey == "" {
		return errors.New("signKey is required")
	}
	if c.KxKey == "" {
		return errors.New("kxKey is required")
	}
	if c.AuditPath == "" {
		return errors.New("auditPath is required")
	}
	if len(c.Devices) == 0 && !pairMode {
		return errors.New("devices is empty, so no phone could ever be authorised")
	}
	seen := map[string]bool{}
	for _, device := range c.Devices {
		if !appPattern.MatchString(device.ID) {
			return fmt.Errorf("device id %q must look like ap_xxxxxxxx", device.ID)
		}
		if device.SignKey == "" {
			return fmt.Errorf("device %q has no signKey", device.ID)
		}
		if seen[device.ID] {
			return fmt.Errorf("device %q is listed twice", device.ID)
		}
		seen[device.ID] = true
	}
	return nil
}

// Load reads a config file for the normal (commanding) mode.
func Load(path string) (File, error) {
	cfg, err := loadFile(path)
	if err != nil {
		return cfg, err
	}
	if err := cfg.Validate(false); err != nil {
		return cfg, fmt.Errorf("config: %s: %w", path, err)
	}
	return cfg, nil
}

// LoadForPairing reads a config file for --pair mode, where an empty device list is the starting
// state rather than a misconfiguration.
func LoadForPairing(path string) (File, error) {
	cfg, err := loadFile(path)
	if err != nil {
		return cfg, err
	}
	if err := cfg.Validate(true); err != nil {
		return cfg, fmt.Errorf("config: %s: %w", path, err)
	}
	return cfg, nil
}

func loadFile(path string) (File, error) {
	var cfg File
	raw, err := os.ReadFile(path)
	if err != nil {
		return cfg, fmt.Errorf("config: %w", err)
	}
	decoder := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(raw))
	if err := decoder.Decode(&cfg); err != nil {
		return cfg, fmt.Errorf("config: decode %s: %w", path, err)
	}
	return cfg, nil
}

// Save writes the config back with 0600, atomically.
//
// Atomic (temp file + rename) because the pairing flow writes the device list at moments when the
// agent may be concurrently read by systemd restarts: a half-written config is a config that fails
// to load, which turns a completed pairing into an uncommandable node.
func Save(path string, cfg File) error {
	if err := cfg.Validate(true); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("config: refusing to save an invalid file: %w", err)
	}
	encoded, err := json.MarshalIndent(cfg, "", "  ")
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	encoded = append(encoded, '\n')
	temp := path + ".tmp"
	if err := os.WriteFile(temp, encoded, 0o600); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	return os.Rename(temp, path)
}

// NewRelayToken mints a device bearer for the relay: 24 random bytes, hex. Hex because the relay
// only requires a bearer string and hex never contains a character that needs escaping when it
// travels through JSON or headers.
func NewRelayToken() string {
	raw := make([]byte, 24)
	if _, err := rand.Read(raw); err != nil {
		// rand.Read only fails if the system entropy source is gone, in which case nothing in the
		// agent can run safely anyway.
		panic(fmt.Sprintf("config: entropy source failed: %v", err))
	}
	return hex.EncodeToString(raw)
}

// NewDeviceID mints an app id for a freshly paired phone. The relay and the agent both match ids
// against ^ap_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,64}$, so 12 hex characters is the narrowest thing that fits.
func NewDeviceID() string {
	raw := make([]byte, 6)
	if _, err := rand.Read(raw); err != nil {
		panic(fmt.Sprintf("config: entropy source failed: %v", err))
	}
	return "ap_" + hex.EncodeToString(raw)
}

// EnsureRelayTokens fills in bearer tokens for hand-written device entries that lack one and
// persists the result. It reports whether the file changed so a caller can log the event rather
// than silently rewriting an operator's file on every boot.
func EnsureRelayTokens(path string) (File, bool, error) {
	cfg, err := loadFile(path)
	if err != nil {
		return cfg, false, err
	}
	if err := cfg.Validate(false); err != nil {
		return cfg, false, fmt.Errorf("config: %s: %w", path, err)
	}
	changed := false
	for i := range cfg.Devices {
		if cfg.Devices[i].RelayToken == "" {
			cfg.Devices[i].RelayToken = NewRelayToken()
			changed = true
		}
	}
	if changed {
		if err := Save(path, cfg); err != nil {
			return cfg, false, err
		}
	}
	return cfg, changed, nil
}